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Generic Pharmaceuticals and the
Unfortunate Hand Dealt to Harmed
Consumers: The Emerging State Court
Resistance
Arlen W. Langvardt*
ABSTRACT
Federal drug regulation law calls for United States Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of prescription
medications but does not contain a provision expressly
preempting tort claims by plaintiffs who claim to have been
harmed by such medications. After three Supreme Court
decisions during the past six years, whether a patient harmed
by a prescription medication can pursue failure-to-warn and
design-defect claims against the drugs manufacturer depends
largely on a happenstance: whether the pharmacist who filled
the patients prescription dispensed a brand-name medication
or, instead, its generic equivalent. Wyeth v. Levine (2009)
established that such claims may go forwardin other words,
they are not preempted by federal lawif the harm-causing
medication used by the plaintiff was an FDA-approved brand
name drug. But in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing (2011) and Mutual
Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett (2013), the Court ruled that
federal law impliedly preempts such claims if the plaintiffs
harm stemmed from using an FDA-approved generic equivalent
of the brand name drug.
The Court sought to shift blame for this odd state of affairs,
lamenting that Congress had dealt an unfortunate hand to
consumers harmed by generics. However, as this Article will
reveal, the Courts strained application of preemption principles
served as the real culprit. Of course, lower federal and state
courts, along with harmed consumers, are stuck with the
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Courts rulings. Congressional action that might remedy the
Mensing-Bartlett unfortunate hand is extremely unlikely. A
proposed FDA regulation that seemed promising has remained
in limbo for a lengthy period of time and appears to have
waning prospects of promulgation.
Interpreting Mensing and Bartlett broadly, the lower
federal courts have ruled that almost all state-law-based claims
by harmed consumers against generic manufacturers are
preempted or otherwise ineligible to go forward. State courts,
however, have shown a much stronger tendency to resist an
overly broad reading of Mensing and Bartlett and to identify
ways that respect those precedents but allow room for certain
state-law-based claims against generic manufacturers to escape
preemption. As this Article will explain, the state court
resistance to the Mensing-Bartlett steamroller has produced
sensible approaches applicable to certain claims against generic
manufacturers, as well as otherssuch as permitting
consumers harmed by generics to sue the relevant brand name
manufacturerthat reflect laudable intentions but are
inadvisable. This Article sorts out the responses that have made
up the state court resistance and explores well-reasoned,
justifiable approaches that can permit certain claims against
generic manufacturers to escape Mensing-Bartletts seemingly
broad preemptive sweep. In the process, harmed consumers can
be afforded partial relief from the unfortunate hand.
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INTRODUCTION
After patents on brand-name medications expire, generic
versions of those drugs may emerge and develop significant
shares of the relevant market.1 Generic versions (hereinafter
generics) have proliferated in recent years and now account
for roughly seventy-five percent of filled prescriptions.2
Legislation designed to further drug-cost-reduction and
enhancement-of-competition objectives has helped to bring
about that development.3
Although federal law provides that new drugs cannot be
placed on the market until they pass a rigorous safety-and-
effectiveness review by the United States Food and Drug
Administration (FDA),4 Congress exempted generics from this
time-consuming and expensive obligation in a 1984 enactment
commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.5 Hatch-Waxman
1. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012) (establishing general principles regarding
patent rights and duration). As will be seen, federal and state laws have
played key roles in encouraging the marketplace presence of generic versions
of brand-name drugs. See infra text accompanying notes 49, 5866.
2. See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2583 (2011)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
3. See id. at 2574, 2581 (majority opinion); see also id. at 258384
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing roles played by the Hatch-Waxman Act
and state statutes in the proliferation of generics).
4. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1), (d) (2012). For further discussion of the new
drug approval process, see infra text accompanying notes 3857.
5. See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2570.
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specified that producers of generics need only show, as a pre-
condition of sale, that their product is equivalent to the
corresponding brand-name versions previously approved by the
FDA.6 This less burdensome pre-sale requirement has operated
to increase the likelihood that generics are brought to market.7
State statutes, moreover, have been instrumental in
helping generics gain market share once they arrive on the
scene. State laws routinely permit, and sometimes even
require, pharmacists to substitute generics for brand-name
drugs prescribed by a physician unless the physician has
specifically barred such a substitution.8 Pharmacists often
dispense generics because they tend to be less expensive than
their brand-name counterparts (certainly less expensive than
the brand-name drugs were when they were still under patent)
and because they may be covered more advantageously by the
patients health insurance plan.9
For patients, then, one might say so far, so goodeven if
the brand-name-versus-generic choice tends to be made for
them rather than by them.10 If the generic is cheaper, choosing
it would seem to be in the patients interest. Presumably even
better from a bang-for-the-buck perspective, the less expensive
generic should be as safe and effective as the brand-name drug
because, as noted earlier, federal law requires that generics be
equivalent to the relevant brand-name versions that have
already received FDA approval.11
What seems a rosy generics picture becomes far less so,
however, for certain patients: those who experienced harm
after using the generics they received when their prescriptions
were filled. They have been dealt an unfortunate hand,
6. Both chemical equivalence and bioequivalence are required. See 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2012). For further discussion of Hatch-Waxman and its
provisions concerning generics, see infra text accompanying notes 6166.
7. See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574, 2581; id. at 258384 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
8. See id. at 258384 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Stacey B. Lee, PLIVA
v. Mensing, Generic Consumers Unfortunate Hand, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POLY
L. & ETHICS 209, 238 (2012).
9. See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 258384.
10. Some states, but clearly not all, require patient consent in order for a
generic to be dispensed. See id. at 2583. Saying that pharmacists often
dispense a generic is probably an understatement. When a generic is
available, pharmacists dispense it, rather than the brand name medication,
approximately ninety percent of the time. Id. at 2584.
11. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).
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according to the U.S. Supreme Court.12 To understand why, one
must consider a trilogy of Supreme Court decisions dealing
with the extent to which federal drug regulation law preempts
state-law-based tort claims.
The first of the three cases, Wyeth v. Levine,13 turned out
well for the plaintiff. In that 2009 decision, the Court rejected
the drug manufacturers preemption defense and permitted the
plaintiffs failure-to-warn claim to proceed, even though the
tort claim contemplated a supposed need for a stronger
warning than the one set forth in the drug label approved by
the FDA during the new-drug-approval process.14 Importantly,
however, Levine involved a brand-name drug, not a generic.15
Two years after Levine, the Court decided another case
involving a failure-to-warn claim against a drug maker. In
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,16 a five-justice majority held that
federal law preempted the plaintiffs failure-to-warn claim
despite its similarity to the claim in Levine.17 The case involved
a generic rather than a brand-name druga critical difference
for the Court, which placed great emphasis on the duty of
sameness imposed by the Hatch-Waxman Act.18 That duty,
the majority reasoned, prohibited the generic manufacturer
from adding to or otherwise departing from the text of the drug
label approved by the FDA for the brand-name version some
years earlier.19 The Court also stressed that generic
manufacturers are not entitled to take an action that brand-
name manufacturers such as the one in Levine can sometimes
take: strengthening warnings in the FDA-approved label and
then going back to the FDA for approval of the changed label.20
Hence, in the Mensing majoritys view, preemption applied
because it was impossible for the defendant to provide what the
plaintiffs state-law-based claim contemplated (a stronger
warning) and remain in compliance with federal law, which
barred the defendant from altering the FDA-approved label.21
12. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2581.
13. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
14. Id. at 56871, 57476, 57881.
15. Id. at 55859.
16. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2567.
17. Id. at 2572, 257778, 258081.
18. Id. at 2572, 257475, 2582.
19. Id. at 257778.
20. Id. at 257576.
21. Id. at 257778.
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The third case in the trilogy, Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v.
Bartlett,22 also involved a generic. In that 2013 decision, the
same five-justice majority that had decided Mensing again
stressed the duty of sameness contemplated by federal law and
held that the impossibility doctrine required preemption of the
plaintiffs design-defect claim.23 The Court reasoned that under
federal law, the generic manufacturer could not depart from
the FDA-approved formulation for the drug and, as in Mensing,
could not change the content of the FDA-approved product
label.24
After Mensing and Bartlett, therefore, whether a patient
harmed by a prescription medication can seek to make out tort
claims against the drugs manufacturer will depend largely
upon the happenstance of whether the pharmacist filled the
prescription with the brand-name medication or, instead, a
generic.25 If the former, tort claims are not preempted.26 If the
latter, preemption is triggeredcausing the patient who often
had no choice in the matter to lose certain potentially
important rights.27 Those who received generics, therefore,
have been dealt what Justice Thomas, in his Mensing majority
opinion, termed an unfortunate hand.28
In Mensing and Bartlett, the Court sought to lay the blame
on Congress.29 Each majority opinion asserted that federal
drug regulation law left the Court no choice but to issue its
preemption rulings; each opinion reminded readers that
Congress, or possibly the FDA, could decide to take action to
ameliorate the preemption problem that the Court supposedly
22. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
23. Id. at 2470, 2475, 247677, 2479.
24. Id. at 2475, 2479.
25. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2583 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice
Thomas conceded as much in his Mensing majority opinion, but emphasized
that the federal drug regulation statutes contemplated such an outcome. See
id. at 258182. He also acknowledged that the plaintiffs inMensing and a case
joined with it for decision purposes would see little sense in their cases
outcome, insofar as it hinged on their having received a generic rather than a
brand name medication. Id. at 2581.
26. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2480.Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2581.
27. Compare Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 55859, 56871, 57476,
57881 (2009) (failure-to-warn claim against brand-name manufacturer not
preempted), with Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 258182 (failure-to-warn claim
against generic manufacturer preempted).
28. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2581.
29. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2480; see Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 258182.
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was powerless to head off.30 For the dissenters in Mensing and
Bartlett, the majoritys blame-it-on-Congress excuse rang
hollow. They criticized the majority for adopting an overly
broad version of the impossibility doctrine and for failing to
consider whether the results reached in the two decisions were
consistent with what Congress would have wanted.31
Whatever the relative merits of the competing arguments
in Mensing and Bartlett, the prevalence of generics in the
marketplace32 means that the preemption holdings in those
cases potentially affect far more would-be plaintiffs than does
the plaintiff-friendly holding in Levine.33 After Mensing and
Bartlett, state tort law will have a significantly diminished role
to play unless: (a) Congress or the FDA meaningfully changes
the rules the Supreme Court interpreted in Mensing and
Bartlett as having sweeping preemptive effect;34 or (b) state
courts interpret Mensing and Bartlett narrowly and recognize
varieties of tort claims that can plausibly avoid preemption.35
Prospect (a) might occur if a proposed FDA regulation that
has long remained stalled were to overcome objections from
generic manufacturers, achieve final rule status, and be
interpreted by the courts as an outcome-altering
countermeasure to the Mensing-Bartlett rationale. As later
discussion will reveal, however, those ifs pose significant
obstacles that leave the proposed regulations ultimate fate
uncertain at best.36 This Article, accordingly, places greater
30. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2480;Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2581.
31. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 248081, 2482 (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 248384, 248586, 249495 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting);
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 258283, 258687, 2589, 259293 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
32. See supra text accompanying notes 89; supra note 10.
33. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 56871, 57476, 57881 (2009).
The Levine dissenters lost the brand-name medications battle over whether
tort claims should be preempted, but they won the corresponding generics
battle in the Mensing-Bartlett tandem and gained a clear advantage in the
larger war over whether the federal regulatory role as to pharmaceuticals
leaves room for regulation under state law. See infra text accompanying notes
21114.
34. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2480 (offering such an indication regarding
action by Congress); see also Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2581 (indicating that
action by Congress or the FDA might change the analysis).
35. Of course, state law could have a greater role to play if the Supreme
Court were to overrule Mensing and Bartlett, but such a development seems
unlikely.
36. See infra notes 234, 268.
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emphasis on prospect (b) and the role state courts may play in
responding appropriately, yet assertively, to Mensing and
Bartlett, so that the hand dealt to patients harmed by
generics is sometimes less unfortunate than the Mensing-
Bartlett duo might suggest. As will be seen, state courts appear
to be warming up to the task by not always giving Mensing and
Bartlett the sweeping effect that lower federal courts have
tended to give those decisions.37
Section II of the Article will furnish background on the
statutes and regulations dealing with FDA oversight of
pharmaceuticals. In addition, Section II will discuss relevant
Supreme Court decisions, most notably the pharmaceuticals
trilogy (Levine, Mensing, and Bartlett). Section III will analyze
and assess the decisions in the trilogy and will summarize
applications of those decisions by the federal courts of appeal.
Section IV will examine cases in which state courts, seemingly
not willing to succumb to Mensing-Bartletts potential
steamrolling effect, have sought to carve out tort claims that
would escape preemption. Section V will assess those efforts
and consider the plausibility or implausibility of the legal
theories they have offered. Section V will also offer
recommendations for further action, in the wake of Mensing-
Bartlett, to achieve a suitable balance between the federal and
state roles in regulating pharmaceuticals and protecting
consumers who experience harm as a result of using them.
I. FDA REGULATION AND KEY SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS
A. THE NDA PROCESS AND RELATED ISSUES
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) bars
manufacturers of pharmaceuticals from introducing any drug
into the marketplace until the necessary approval has been
obtained from the FDA.38 Truly new drugs must clear the New
Drug Approval (NDA) hurdle.39 Because the brand-name
medications referred to in the Articles introduction fit within
the new drugs category, this discussion will employ the terms
37. See infra text accompanying notes 337604.
38. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012).
39. Id. § 355(b).
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brand-name medications (or brand-name drugs) and new
drugs interchangeably.
The NDA process calls for rigorous FDA review and is both
time-consuming and expensive for manufacturers of new
drugs.40 These manufacturers must compile and submit
voluminous materials that include the results of extensive
clinical studies and other information bearing upon the safety
and effectiveness of the drug under review.41 They must also
submit the label they propose to use for their drug, because
FDA approval of the labels exact text is required.42 If the FDA
concludes that the new drug is safe for use for the purposes
described in the NDA and under the conditions contemplated
by the proposed label, approval of the NDA will be granted.43
Once a brand-name drug and its label have received the
requisite approval, the manufacturer cannot change the drug
formulation, including its active ingredients, in any meaningful
way unless the FDA approves the change.44 As a general rule,
the manufacturer of the brand-name medication cannot modify
the approved label without submitting a supplemental
application to the FDA and receiving the agencys prior
approval.45 However, if later-acquired information potentially
bearing upon the drugs safety causes the manufacturer to
believe that a label with a stronger warning is necessary, the
manufacturer may begin using the strengthened label and
simultaneously request FDA approval for the change.46 An
FDA regulation known as the changes being effected (CBE)
regulation authorizes the brand-name manufacturer to utilize
this exception to the general rule that a label change requires
prior FDA approval.47
40. See, e.g., Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2471 (2013);
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2574 (2011).
41. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b).
42. Id. § 355(b)(1)(F).
43. Id. § 355(d).
44. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(2)(i) (2015); Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2471.
45. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(F) (2012); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 568
(2009).
46. Levine, 555 U.S. at 568.
47. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A) (2015). The option provided by the CBE
regulation proved to be important in Levine. See Levine, 555 U.S. at 56870.
For discussion of Levine, see infra text accompanying notes 68127. The FDA
has taken the position that the CBE regulation permits only brand-name
manufacturers, not manufacturers of generics, to strengthen the approved
labels warnings without the FDAs prior approval. See PLIVA, Inc. v.
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Even though a drug label has received FDA approval, drug
makers have a continuing duty to make sure the label provides
adequate warnings in the event that significant safety-related
information becomes known after approval of the label.48 This
duty stems from the federal misbranding statute, which
provides that a drug is misbranded if its label does not
contain adequate warnings against unsafe dosages of the
medication or unsafe methods or duration of administration.49
Accordingly, the FDA has concluded, drug makers that acquire
important safety-related information after the drug is on the
market are obligated to petition the agency for approval of a
strengthened label if the previously approved one is no longer
adequate.50 This petitioning of the FDA must take place before
the drug manufacturer begins to use the revised label, unless
the drug maker is a brand-name manufacturer and has chosen
to pursue the CBE route referred to earlier.51 Although the
FDA takes the position that the existing CBE regulation
cannot be invoked by manufacturers of generics,52 it regards
the duty stemming from the misbranding statute to apply to all
drug makers, whether of brand-name medications or of
generics.53
Until fairly recent years, the FDA could not actually order
use of a particular strengthened label even when a proper
request for a revised label had been made.54 Rather, the FDA
had to work with the brand-name manufacturer to reach an
agreement on the text of a revised label.55 A 2007 statutory
amendment, however, granted the FDA greater authority.56
Now, when later-acquired safety information warrants, the
FDA may order the brand-name manufacturer to revise the
label in accordance with FDA instructions regarding content,
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2575 (2011). A proposed FDA regulation, if
promulgated, would make the CBE option available to manufacturers of
generics. For discussion of that proposed regulation, see infra notes 234, 268.
48. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.80(e), 314.80(b) (2015); Levine, 555 U.S. at 570
71.
49. 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(2) (2012);Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2576.
50. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e) (2005); Levine, 555 U.S. at 57071.
51. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 257576; Levine, 555 U.S. at 57071.
52. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2575.
53. Id. at 257677.
54. See Levine, 555 U.S. at 567.
55. Id. at 567, 571.
56. Id. at 567.
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regardless of whether the manufacturer agrees with the
specific textual changes.57
B. THE ANDA PROCESS AND RELATED ISSUES
General principles of patent law establish that the
expiration of a patent on a name-brand drug entitles
competitors of the drug to enter the marketplace with
genericsmedications having the same formulation as the
formerly patented medication.58 Prior to 1984, however, the
time-consuming and expensive FDA approval requirement
described above applied to all drugs (generics included).59 This
requirement made the production of generics a less attractive
venture than it might have been.60
The regulatory environment for generics changed in 1984,
however. In that years Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress sought to
make the regulatory approval process less burdensome and less
expensive for generics (and thereby increase the likelihood that
generics would enter the marketplace and compete with brand-
name drugs).61 Hatch-Waxman exempted generics from the
NDA review that truly new drugs must undergo.62 Rather than
requiring producers of generics to conduct extensive clinical
trials of the sort necessary for initial approval of a drug, Hatch-
Waxman provided that makers of generics need only
demonstrate to the FDA, through the Abbreviated New Drug
Approval (ANDA) process, that their versions of the
medications are equivalent to the brand-name drug previously
approved by the agency.63 With its focus being on equivalence,
as opposed to the safety and effectiveness issues already
57. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-85, 121 Stat. 823, 92426 (2007) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4) (2012)).
See Levine, 555 U.S. at 567, 571.
58. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 171 (2012).
59. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2574 (2011).
60. SeeMut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2471 (2013).
61. See id.;Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574.
62. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2012).
63. Id. The requisite equivalence has two mandatory components. First,
the generic must be chemically equivalent to the brand name drug. This
means that the generic must match the brand name drug in terms of active
ingredients, methods of administration, dosage form, and strength. Id. §
355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iii). Second, the generic must also be bioequivalent to the
brand-name drug. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv). Bioequivalence is present if the
generic has the same rate and extent of absorption as the brand-name
medication. Id. § 355(j)(8)(B).
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addressed by the FDA when it approved the relevant brand-
name drug, ANDA review is significantly less rigorous, less
time-consuming, and less expensive than the NDA process.64
Besides requiring that the generic must be equivalent to
the brand-name drug, Hatch-Waxman mandated that the
generics label must also be the same as the FDA-approved
label for the brand-name drug.65 Accordingly, under what the
Supreme Court has referred to as Hatch-Waxmans duty of
sameness, generics cannot depart from the brand-name drug
in terms of drug design or product label.66 This duty of
sameness proved critical, as will be seen, to the second and
third decisions in the Supreme Courts recent trilogy of cases
dealing with whether federal law preempts tort claims against
drug manufacturers.67 This Article now considers the three
decisions.
C. THE TRILOGY, PART 1:WYETH V. LEVINE
Ruling in pro-plaintiff fashion in the first of the three
cases, Wyeth v. Levine,68 the Supreme Court rejected drug
manufacturer Wyeths attempt to invoke a preemption defense
against Levines tort claims. 69 The claims pertained to
Phenergan, a brand-name anti-nausea drug for which Wyeth
received FDA approval in the 1950s.70 During a medical clinic
visit in which she sought treatment for migraine headaches,
Levine was given Phenergan in addition to a potent pain
medication.71 The same treatment had been provided to Levine
on previous occasions, though not via the Phenergan
administration method used in the instance giving rise to her
lawsuit.72
If Phenergan is exposed to arterial blood, gangrene results
quickly and irreversibly.73 Phenergan is typically given safely
through use of an intravenous (IV) drip or through
64. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2471.
65. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v); see id. § 355(j)(4)(G).
66. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 247576, 2481; Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2575.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 128210.
68. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
69. Id. at 55859, 57173, 581.
70. Id. at 559, 561, 578 & n.11.
71. Id. at 559.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 559.
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intramuscular injection.74 In the instance at issue, however, a
physicians assistant administered Phenergan to Levine by way
of a third method, IV-push.75 This method, which involves
injection directly into a vein, carries the benefit of quicker relief
from nausea but presents significant risks if it is not carried
out correctly.76 In Levines case, Phenergan entered an artery,
either because the needle penetrated it directly or because the
medication escaped from the vein, entered surrounding tissue,
and came into contact with arterial blood.77 Levine thereafter
developed gangrene, necessitating amputation of her right
hand and later her entire forearm.78
Over the years, the product label for Phenergan had
undergone changes as a result of supplemental applications by
Wyeth to the FDA regarding later-acquired evidence indicating
the risks of inadvertent intra-arterial injection of the
medication.79 The most recent FDA-approved label warned
about the gangrene danger following inadvertent intra-arterial
injection and expressed a preference for use of the IV-drip
method of administration. However, the label did not expressly
warn that because of its risks, the IV-push method should
never be used.80
In the negligence and strict liability claims she filed
against Wyeth, Levine contended that given the severe risks
posed by the IV-push method as compared with its lesser
benefit, Wyeths label should have warned that the method was
simply too dangerous to use.81 Evidence adduced at trial
indicated that since the 1960s, there had been at least 20
reports of amputations similar to Levines following
inadvertent intra-arterial injections of Phenergan.82 After a
Vermont jury ruled in Levines favor and awarded her several
million dollars in damages,83 the states highest court upheld
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 55960, 561.
77. Id. at 1191.
78. Id. at 559. She experienced considerable pain and suffering and
incurred significant medical expenses. In addition, she lost her livelihood as a
professional musician. Id.
79. Id. at 561.
80. Id. at 560, 56162.
81. Id. at 55960, 562, 56465.
82. Id. at 56263.
83. Id. at 562. The jury awarded $7.4 million in damages, but the trial
court reduced that amount to allow for funds Levine had received in
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the verdict.84 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in order to decide whether the FDA approvals
granted to Wyeth preempted Levines tort claims.85
Federal preemption of state regulation (including,
sometimes, state-law-based tort claims) comes in two basic
forms: express preemption and implied preemption.86 Express
preemption can apply when a provision in federal law expressly
bars state regulation on the relevant subjects addressed in the
law, and a court concludes that the state action at issue falls
within the scope of the preemption provision.87 Wyeth could not
attempt to invoke express preemption, however, because there
is no preemption clause in the previously discussed federal
statutory provisions under which the FDA approves new drugs
and their product labels.88
The relevant drug regulation sections in the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetics Act thus differ from the federal statutory
regime under which the FDA is charged with deciding whether
to approve medical devices for entry into the marketplace.89
The latter regime, stemming from the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976, contains a preemption clause90 that
proved critical to a Supreme Court decision handed down only
a year before Levine.91 In that decision, Riegel v. Medtronic,
settlements of claims against the clinic where she had been treated and
against the physicians assistant who attempted to use the IV-push method of
administering Phenergan. Id.
84. Id. at 563.
85. Id.
86. E.g., id. at 56364, 565 & n.3, 567. For background on the types of
preemption, see Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L.
REV. 1 (2013); see also Ernest A. Young, The Ordinary Diet of the Law: The
Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253,
26978 (2011).
87. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 316, 32122, 32325 (2008);
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 48485 (1996).
88. Levine, 555 U.S. at 574.
89. Id. at 566569.
90. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012). The clause reads as follows:
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect
with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under
this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.
Id.
91. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316.
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Inc.,92 an eight-justice majority held that if a medical device
and its product label have received pre-market approval from
the FDA, tort claims against the device manufacturer are
preempted under the terms of the preemption clause.93
However, tort claims against the device manufacturer are not
preempted if, as is the case with many devices, the device at
issue was required only to undergo a form of FDA review that
is less rigorous than pre-market approval.94
92. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 312.
93. Id. at 31718, 32223, 32425, 326, 330. Under the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976, the requirement of pre-market approvalthe FDAs
highest level of review for safety and effectivenessapplies to truly new Class
III medical devices first offered for sale following the effective date of the
MDA. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii) (2012). See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 31617. The
Class III category includes heart-related devices such as the FDA-approved
balloon catheter at issue in Riegel. Id. at 317, 319. After characterizing pre-
market approval as a rigorous process in which safety-related federal
requirements specific to the relevant device are imposed, id. at 317, 32223,
the Riegel Court rejected the argument that the preemption section in the
statute serves only to prohibit states from establishing separate FDA-like
regulatory regimes. See id. at 32425. The Court concluded instead that the
plaintiffs various tort claims, which focused on supposed design defects and
failures to provide adequate warnings, were attempts under state law to have
courts impose safety-oriented requirements different from, or in addition to
the device-specific requirements associated with pre-market approval. Id. at
32526; see 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2012). Therefore, the Court held that the
conditions set forth in the statutes preemption section were met and that the
plaintiffs claims were preempted. 552 U.S. at 323-28, 329. Riegels preemption
holding does not apply, however, to many of the medical devices cleared for
sale by the FDA. See infra note 94.
94. The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) require pre-market
approval for truly new devices first made available for sale after the MDAs
effective date. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii) (2012). However, devices dating
from prior to 1976, as well as devices substantially equivalent to pre-1976
devices, are grandfathered under the pre-1976 legal regime, which did not
require pre-market approval by the FDA. Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(1) (2012).
Although the FDA conducts a substantial equivalence review for many of the
grandfathered devices, that review involves far less FDA scrutiny than the
pre-market approval process does. See id. § 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(1)(A) (2012).
This review is often called the § 510(k) process because of the relevant
statutory sections original number. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317. Far more
medical devices that enter the market do so after completing the § 510(k)
process than do so after having to complete pre-market review. Id. State law-
based product liability claims are not considered preempted if they pertain to
devices that have undergone only §510(k) review, because that review, unlike
the pre-market approval process, focuses on equivalence rather than safety.
See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 32223. This conclusion stems from another Supreme
Court case to which Medtronic was a party, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S.
470 (1996). In Lohr, the Court concluded that the FDAs substantial
equivalence review of a grandfathered medical device did not involve the
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Unlike the medical device manufacturer in Riegel, Wyeth
could not point to a statutory preemption clause in an attempt
to avoid liability in Levine.95 With no express preemption
argument being available, Wyeth sought to rely on implied
preemption principles.96 Implied preemption may take place if
a court concludes that it would be impossible for a defendant to
comply with conflicting federal and state duties.97 In such a
situation, the federal law will control and the state duties
cannot be enforced against the defendant because they are
preempted.98 Implied preemption can also be found when the
court concludes that the enforcement of duties under state law
could interfere too seriously with the purposes and objectives of
federal law.99
Wyeth made arguments based on implied preemptions
impossibility variety as well as its purposes-and-objectives
variety.100 In a majority opinion authored by Justice Stevens,
and joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
the Court rejected Wyeths arguments and held that the
plaintiffs failure-to-warn claims were not preempted.101
imposition of federal device-specific requirements for purposes of the MDAs
previously quoted preemption section, and that the same was true of basic
labeling requirements applicable to medical devices generally. Id. at 49294,
50002. The Court went on to hold in Lohr that in the absence of the type of
federal requirements contemplated by the preemption section, state law-
based negligence claims could not be seen as imposing different or
addition[al] . . . requirement[s] and thus were not preempted by the MDA.
Id. For a comparison of preemption issues in the medical devices context with
preemption issues in the pharmaceuticals context, see Marcia Boumil, FDA
Approval of Drugs and Devices: Preemption of State Laws for Parallel Tort
Claims, 18 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POLY 1, 3033, 3540 (2015).
95. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 593 (2009).
96. Id. at 56364, 567, 574 (noting lack of preemption provision in federal
drug regulation laws).
97. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2577 (2011); Levine, 555 U.S.
at 563, 568, 573, 581.
98. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2577; Levine, 555 U.S. at 563, 568, 573, 581.
Impossibility arguments serve as a variant of conflict preemption, which can
occur when federal and state law are so greatly in conflict that the state law,
or rights contemplated under it, must fall. See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 at
2577.
99. Levine, 555 U.S. at 56364, 573. The purposes-and-objectives type of
preemption is sometimes known as obstacles preemption. See Meltzer, supra
note 86, at 3, 8, 14.
100. Levine, 555 U.S. at 563, 568.
101. Levine, 555 U.S. at 557, 55859, 57173, 581 (2009).
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Concurring in the judgment, Justice Thomas provided a sixth
vote for the outcome.102
Justice Stevens began the Courts analysis in Levine by
noting two foundational principles established in previous
decisions dealing with preemption: first, that congressional
purpose is the ultimate touchstone in preemption analysis;103
and second, that in any preemption case,
and particularly in those in which Congress has legislated . . . in a
field which the States have traditionally occupied, [courts begin with
the] assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress.104
After tracing the history of federal regulation of
pharmaceuticals, the Court observed that even as it enhanced
the FDAs role, Congress took care to preserve state law.105
Tort lawsuits continued to be brought, notwithstanding the
FDAs acquisition of a critical regulatory role regarding
drugs.106 Moreover, the Court emphasized, when Congress
enacted an express pre-emption provision for medical devices in
1976, . . . , it declined to enact such a provision for prescription
drugs.107
The Court turned to Wyeths impossibility argument. The
drug maker contended that federal law commanded it to
continue using the very product label the FDA had approved,
but that the plaintiffs state-law-based tort claims effectively
called for a changed label providing a stronger warning.108
Thus, Wyeth maintained, it was impossible to comply with both
102. Id. at 582 (Thomas, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 565 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
104. Id. at 565 (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485) (further internal citation
omitted). The quoted language from Lohr included language from Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), a decision instrumental in
the development of the so-called presumption against preemption. See Young,
supra note 86, at 26669. The presumption against preemption is designed to
respect the states as independent sovereigns. See Levine, 555 U.S. at 565 n.3.
Accordingly, courts assume that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-
law causes of action. Id. (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485). For discussion of the
usefulness of the presumption against preemption, see Meltzer, supra note 86,
at 5255. Among other things, the presumption against preemption can serve
as, effectively, a tie-breaker. Young, supra note 86, at 271.
105. Levine, 555 U.S. at 567.
106. Id.
107. Levine, 555 U.S. at 567. For discussion of the express preemption
provision in the federal statutes dealing with medical devices, see supra text
accompanying notes 9094.
108. Id. at 568.
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federal law and state law.109 The Court disagreed, pointing to
the previously discussed CBE regulation.110 Under that
regulation, new or reanalyzed safety-related information
entitles brand-name manufacturers, such as Wyeth, to depart
from the approved label text and begin using a modified label
that provides more rigorous warnings.111 The manufacturer
relying on the CBE regulation must apply to the FDA for a new
approval at the time it begins using the altered label, but,
importantly, it need not have received that approval before
using the new label.112
Justice Stevens also emphasized that the misbranding
section in the federal drug regulation laws established a
continuing obligation on the part of drug manufacturers to
ensure that the warnings on their product labels remain
adequate.113 This meant that when the risk of gangrene from
IV-push injection of Phenergan became apparent, Wyeth had a
duty to provide a warning that adequately described that risk,
and the CBE regulation permitted it to provide such a warning
before receiving the FDAs approval.114 The Court reasoned,
therefore, that it was not impossible for Wyeth to remain in
compliance with federal law while doing what state law
109. Id.
110. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 4547; supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 4547; supra note 47. Noting that
the CBE regulation permits a label change if newly acquired information
warrants the change, 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A) (2015), Wyeth argued that
the CBE avenue was unavailable to it because much of the information
pertaining to the relevant safety issue had already been presented to the FDA
and thus should not be seen as newly acquired information. Levine, 555 U.S.
at 56869. Justice Stevens pointed out, however, that in its notice regarding
the final CBE rule, the FDA defined newly acquired information as including
not only new data but also new analyses of previously submitted data. Id. at
569. See Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved
Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49604 (Aug. 22, 2008) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314, 601, 814). This definition, he continued,
recognizes that risk information accumulates over time and that the same
data may take on a different meaning in light of subsequent developments.
Levine, 555 U.S. at 569. Hence, Wyeth could have employed the CBE route for
implementing a revised label even if it was reanalyzing previously presented
information. See id. at 56970.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 4547.
113. Levine, 555 U.S. at 57071. The misbranding statute provides that a
drug is misbranded if its label does not adequately warn about safety-related
matters associated with the medication. 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(2)(2012.) See supra
text accompanying notes 4849.
114. Levine, 555 U.S. at 571.
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contemplated.115 Concluding the Courts rejection of Wyeths
impossibility argument, Justice Stevens issued an important
reminder: Impossibility preemption is a demanding
defense.116
The Levine Court then turned to Wyeths other preemption
argument: that expecting the drug maker to comply with a
state-law-based duty to furnish a stronger warning would
unduly interfere with the purposes and objectives of federal law
regarding drug labeling.117 Wyeth contended that federal law
envisioned FDA approval as setting both a floor and ceiling
supposedly meaning that once FDA approval of a drugs label
has taken place, there remains no regulatory room for a state-
law-based claim that the label was inadequate.118 The most
glaring problem with this argument, the Court explained, is
that all evidence of Congress purposes is to the contrary.119
Justice Stevens noted that in the several-decades-long history
of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA), Congress had
never provided a federal right of action to consumers harmed
by unsafe drugs.120 This inaction suggested likely congressional
determinations that widely available state rights of action
provided appropriate relief for injured consumers and that
state-law remedies further consumer protection by motivating
manufacturers to produce safe and effective drugs and to give
adequate warnings.121
Another bit of congressional inaction merited the Courts
emphasis: If Congress thought state-law suits posed an
obstacle to its objectives, it surely would have enacted an
express pre-emption provision at some point during the FDCAs
115. Id. Even though prior approval by the FDA is not required when a
manufacturer pursues the CBE route, FDA approval of the strengthened label
will ultimately be necessary if the manufacturer is to be able to continue using
that label over the long term. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A); Levine, 555
U.S. at 571. It is conceivable, of course, that the FDA might decide to reject
the strengthened label. Without more, however, that potential outcome would
not change the analysis. [A]bsent clear evidence that the FDA would not have
approved a change to Phenergans label, the Court stated, we will not
conclude that it was impossible for Wyeth to comply with both federal and
state requirements. Id. The Court noted that Wyeth had presented no such
evidence. Id. at 572.
116. Levine, 555 U.S. at 573.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 57374.
119. Id. at 574.
120. Levine, 555 U.S. at 574.
121. Id.
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70-year history.122 But Congress had not done so, despite its
inclusion of a preemption provision in the statutes dealing with
FDA approval of medical devices.123 The Court reasoned that
the silence of Congress on the matter of preemption, coupled
with its certain awareness of the prevalence of state tort
litigation, is powerful evidence that Congress did not intend
FDA oversight to be the exclusive means of ensuring drug
safety and effectiveness.124
Summarizing its conclusions about congressional intent,
the FDAs previous expression of views, and the roles tort
litigation may play, the Court stated:
In keeping with Congress decision not to preempt common-law tort
suits, it appears that the FDA traditionally regarded state law as a
complementary form of drug regulation. The FDA has limited
resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the market, and
manufacturers have superior access to information about their
drugs, especially in the postmarketing phase as new risks emerge.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 574. The express preemption provision in the federal statutes
dealing with medical devices is discussed at supra text accompanying notes
9094.
124. Levine, 555 U.S. at 575. Thus, this evidence also suggested that
Congress did not regard state tort litigation as an obstacle to achieving its
purposes. Id. Wyeth sought to bolster its argument for purposes-and-
objectives preemption by pointing to an FDA assertion that the agencys
approval of a drug label should preempt state-law-based claims for failure to
warn. Id. For three key reasons, the Levine majority ascribed no significance
to this FDA statement. First, it was not a statement by Congress and was
inconsistent with the previously noted indications of congressional purposes.
Id.; see also id. at 57678. Second, it appeared in the preamble to a 2006 FDA
regulation dealing with the format and content of drug labels, not in the
substantive provisions of any regulation. See id. at 575, 57677, 57879, 580.
Third, it contradicted the FDAs longstanding position that state tort law was
not an obstacle to achievement of the FDAs mission. Id. at 57779. In
addition, the Court expressed concern about a procedural irregularity. The
relevant FDA notice of proposed rulemaking said that the proposed
regulation, if promulgated, would not operate to preempt state law. However,
the 2006 preamble to the finalized rule made its sweeping preemption
assertion without the states or potentially affected parties having any
opportunity to comment. Id. at 577. This procedural failure made the FDAs
supposed views on state law . . . inherently suspect. Id. The Court stated
that the FDAs dramatic change in position regarding state-law-based
litigation, id. at 579, coming as it did in a mere preamble to a regulation and
against a statutory backdrop in which Congress has repeatedly declined to
preempt state law, id. at 581, did not merit the deference sometimes
extended to agency interpretations. See id. at 57681. Moreover, Justice
Stevens stressed, the Court is loath to defer to an agencys conclusions about
federal preemption of state law, absent a clear indication from Congress that
the agency should weigh in on that question. Id. at 57677.
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State tort suits uncover unknown drug hazards and provide
incentives for drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly.
They also serve a distinct compensatory function that may
motivate injured persons to come forward with information. Failure-
to-warn actions, in particular, lend force to the FDCAs premise that
manufacturers, not the FDA, bear primary responsibility for their
drug labeling at all times.125
Having already rejected Wyeths impossibility argument,126
the Court held that the plaintiffs tort claims did not interfere
with purposes underlying the federal drug regulation laws and
thus were not subject to preemption on that basis.127
D. THE TRILOGY, PART 2: PLIVA, INC. V. MENSING
Two years after Levine, the Supreme Court decided PLIVA,
Inc. v. Mensing.128 This second decision in the Courts
pharmaceuticals trilogy again presented the question whether
federal drug regulation law preempts plaintiffs state-law-based
claims that a drug manufacturer failed to warn adequately
about a danger associated with its medication.129 But this time
the Court answered the question differently, holding the claims
to be preempted.130 Whereas Levine was a case against the
manufacturer of a brand-name drug, Mensing was a case
against a manufacturer of a generic version of such a drug. For
the five-justice majority, this distinction proved to be critical.131
125. Id. at 57879.
126. See Levine, 555 U.S. at 56873. In his concurrence in the judgment,
Justice Thomas agreed that it was not impossible for Wyeth to comply with
both federal and state law, and that the plaintiffs tort claims therefore should
not be preempted. Id. at 58283 (Thomas, J., concurring). He declined to join
the majority opinion, however, because of his objections to the form of implied
preemption that focuses on congressional purposes and objectives. See id. at
583604. For discussion and analysis of Justice Thomass objection to this
variety of preemption (which is sometimes known as obstacle preemption), see
Meltzer, supra note 86, at 24, 89, 35. See also Young, supra note 86, at
32728 (discussing Justice Thomass objections to obstacle preemption).
127. Levine, 555 U.S. at 581. Justice Alito authored a dissenting opinion
that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia joined. Id. at 604 (Alito, J.,
dissenting). Regarding the case as an example of tragic facts mak[ing] bad
law, the dissenters interpreted the federal drug regulation statutes as setting
up a regime in which FDA approval is authoritative and the agencys
judgments are not to be second-guessed by juries in tort cases. See id. at
60626.
128. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2567 (2011).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2572.
131. See id. at 258182. Justice Thomas authored the majority opinion,
which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Alito joined.
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Reglan, a brand-name drug used in treatment of digestive
tract problems, was approved by the FDA in 1980. Generic
versions of the drug, whose common name is metoclopramide,
later entered the marketplace.132 Evidence gathered over the
years indicated that long-term use of metoclopramide (whether
the brand-name drug or a generic equivalent) can cause tardive
dyskinesia, a severe neurological disorder.133 Of patients who
take the drug for several years, up to twenty-nine percent
develop tardive dyskinesia.134 In light of this information, the
labels for Reglan and the generics have changed since the
original approval in 1980. Stronger FDA-approved warnings
about the tardive dyskinesia risk associated with long-term use
were added to the labels in 1985 and 2004.135
In 2001 and 2002, physicians prescribed Reglan for the
plaintiffs in Mensing and a case consolidated with it for
decision purposes.136 Relying on state laws of the sort described
earlier in the Article,137 pharmacists dispensed generics, rather
than Reglan, to the plaintiffs. Both plaintiffs took the drug for
several years, and both developed tardive dyskinesia.138 In
later tort actions against the generic manufacturers whose
medications they used, the plaintiffs contended that given the
accumulating evidence about the tardive dyskinesia risk
presented by long-term use of metoclopramide, the
manufacturers had failed to employ adequate warning
labels.139 After lower courts rejected the manufacturers
preemption defenses, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether federal drug regulation law preempts tort
Id. at 2571. Of the five justices in the majority, only Justice Kennedy had also
been part of the Levine majority, though Justice Thomas had concurred in the
judgment in that case. See supra text accompanying notes 10102. The Chief
Justice and Justices Scalia and Alito had been in the minority in Levine. See
supra note 127 and accompanying text.
132. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2572.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. For instance, the label change the FDA approved in 2004 warned
that Reglan use should not exceed 12 weeks in duration. Id. The warning
was made even stronger in an FDA-ordered change in 2009, though that
change in the label came after the events giving rise to Mensing. See id. at
2573, 2574 n.1.
136. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2573.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 89.
138. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2573.
139. Id.
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claims premised on the contention that generic manufacturers
failed to include stronger warnings on their drug labels.140
Justice Thomas began the analysis in Mensing by noting
that under the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic drug must have
the same composition as the corresponding brand-name drug
and must bear labeling identical to the labeling approved by
the FDA for the brand-name drug.141 Hatch-Waxman,
therefore, sets up a duty of sameness.142 According to the
Mensing majority, that duty tied the generic manufacturers
hands regarding label content and thus related directly to the
defendants preemption argument.143 The generic
manufacturers contended that they could not do what the
plaintiffs state-law-based tort claims called for them to do
use a modified label with even stronger warningsand remain
in compliance with the federal requirement that they use the
same label previously approved for the relevant brand-name
drug.144 Hence, they contended, preemption on the ground of
impossibility should apply.145
En route to agreeing with the generic manufacturers
impossibility argument,146 the Court rejected three key
arguments by the plaintiffs. First, the plaintiffs contended that
despite the general duty of sameness noted above, the
previously discussed CBE regulation would have permitted the
generic makers to use a modified label with strengthened
warnings before receiving FDA approval.147 The plaintiffs
maintained, therefore, that it was not impossible for the
defendants to do what the tort claims against them
contemplated and still act in accordance with federal law.148
Deferring to an FDA interpretation that regarded the CBE
option as available only to brand-name manufacturers, not to
generic manufacturers, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs
first anti-impossibility argument failed.149
140. Id. at 2772, 2573.
141. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A) (2012);Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574.
142. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2575.
143. See id. at 257475, 257778.
144. Id. at 257778.
145. Id.
146. Id.; see also id. at 258182.
147. Id. at 2575.
148. Id. For discussion of the CBE regulation, see supra text accompanying
notes 4547.
149. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 257576. Recall that in Wyeth v. Levine, 555
U.S. 555 (2009), the brand-name manufacturers ability to pursue the CBE
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Second, the plaintiffs opposed the generic manufacturers
impossibility argument by contending that the defendants
could have sent Dear Doctor letters to prescribing physicians
in an effort to communicate safety related information that
went beyond the approved labels content.150 The Court cited an
FDA interpretation that treated Dear Doctor letters as
labeling for purposes of Hatch-Waxmans requirement that
generics only employ the approved . . . labeling. In this
interpretation, the FDA concluded that a generic makers use of
Dear Doctor letters containing additional warnings would
amount to unlawful use of unapproved labeling.151 Again
deferring to the FDA, the Court rejected the plaintiffs
argument that the defendants could have employed Dear
Doctor letters.152
Third, the plaintiffs arguedthis time with an FDA
interpretation seemingly in their favorthat all drug makers
(brand-name and generic) have a continuing duty stemming
from the federal misbranding statute to ensure that their
product labels contain adequate safety-related warnings.153
According to the plaintiffs and the FDA, the generic
manufacturers were obligated to propose a strengthened
warning label to the FDA, which could then have tried to work
with the manufacturer to seek agreement on the text of a
revised label.154 The plaintiffs contended, therefore, that
impossibility preemption should not apply because the
defendants were obligated to set in motion a process that could
have led to a strengthened warning label of the sort
contemplated by the tort claims at issue.155
After noting that the generic manufacturers disputed
whether they actually had an obligation under federal law to
propose a stronger warning label, the Court stopped short of
avenue was a key reason why the Court rejected the argument that
impossibility preemption should apply. See id. at 56870. The FDA has since
proposed a regulation under which the CBE option would be made available to
generic manufacturers, but the proposed regulation is long-stalled and
remains unpromulgated. Its ultimate fate is uncertain. See infra notes 234,
268.
150. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2576.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. For discussion of the misbranding statute, see supra text
accompanying notes 4853.
155. See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2576, 2578-79.
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deferring to the FDA and adopting its position.156 The Court
indicated instead that it would assume, without deciding the
issue, that the FDA was correct in concluding that the generic
makers had such a duty.157 Justice Thomas observed, however,
that even if the FDA was correct on that point, the plaintiffs
still did not have an adequate answer to the defendants
impossibility argument.158
Although he conceded that the plaintiffs had made a fair
argument when they contended that the manufactures should
not be deemed to have carried their burden of proving
impossibility when they had not even attempted to launch a
process that might have led to a stronger label, Justice Thomas
declined to accept the argument.159 An application by the
generic manufacturers for a strengthened label would not have
guaranteed that such a label would come about, because the
law in effect at the relevant time indicated that such an
application would only have justified FDA attempts to seek an
agreement with the brand-name manufacturer on revised
language for the label.160 Complying with a supposed federal
duty to request a stronger label would not have satisfied a
state-law duty to use a stronger label, the Court indicated.161
Therefore, according to the Mensing majority, it was
impossible for generic manufacturers to fulfill their federal and
state duties on their own.162 They could not independently
156. See id. at 257677, 2578 (2011).
157. Id.
158. See id. at 257778.
159. Id. at 2579.
160. Id. at 257879, 258081. Prior to 2007, the FDA could not order the
use of a particular strengthened label even if it concluded that an application
for such a label was meritorious. Rather, in such a situation, the FDA was
limited to working with the brand-name manufacturer in an effort to reach an
agreement on revised text for the label. See supra text accompanying notes
5557. A 2007 enactment granted the FDA the authority to order use of a
particular label in such a situation. See id. In deciding Mensing, however, the
Court did not consider whether the 2007 grant of this authority to the FDA
would have any effect on the case. Justice Thomas noted that because the
relevant events in Mensing preceded the 2007 action by Congress, the pre-
2007 statutes would control the case. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574 n.1. He
stated that the Court was express[ing] no view on the impact of the 2007
Act. Id.
161. See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2578, 258081.
162. Id. at 257779, 258081. The focus on impossibility in light of the
statutory rules regarding generics was consistent with Justice Thomass
preferred approach to preemption: textualism, as opposed to conducting a
purposes-and-objectives (or obstacles) inquiry. Meltzer, supra note 86, at 23.
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satisfy their federal and state obligations because, under
federal law, further actions by the FDA would have been
necessary in order for a stronger warning label to have come
into being.163 The possibility that a stronger warning label
might have resulted from an application for such a label was
not enough to eliminate the impossibility problem.164 Hence,
the Court concluded, preemption of the plaintiffs tort claims
was warranted.165
Justice Thomas acknowledged that the plaintiffs would see
little sense in the Courts decision, given that their claims
would not have been preempted if the pharmacists who filled
their prescriptions had dispensed the relevant brand-name
drug rather than a generic.166 But the outcome, he noted, was
simply the product of the unfortunate hand that Congress
had dealt consumers of generics in the federal drug regulation
laws.167
Justice Sotomayor issued a vigorous dissent in which
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined.168 Accusing the
Mensing majority of effectively rewrit[ing] the Levine decision
of only two years earlier,169 Justice Sotomayor criticized the
majority for not applying the presumption against preemption
that had been recognized in prior decisions.170 She also
contended that through his focus on whether the generic
manufacturers could independently satisfy their state and
federal obligations, Justice Thomas had unjustifiably expanded
the impossibility doctrine and had weakened the demanding
For discussion of the problems with an exclusively textualist approach, see id.
at 45, 89, 35, 4652.
163. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2580. In referring to acting independently,
the Court meant acting unilaterally, without having to depend upon further
action by the FDA. See id. at 257879, 258081. The Court mentioned acting
independently at least four times in Mensing. See id. at 2579, 2580, 2581,
2581 n.8.
164. See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 257879.
165. Id. at 257778, 258081.
166. Id. at 2581.
167. Id.; see id. at 2582. Suggesting that Congress had left the Court no
choice but to rule as it did, the majority noted that Congress and the FDA
retain the authority to change the law and regulations if they so desire. Id.
168. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 2582. For discussion of Levine, see supra text accompanying
notes 68127.
170. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2583 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see id. at
2589.
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burden that defendants asserting impossibility had historically
been obligated to carry.171
Reminding readers that the purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone in determinations of whether preemption
is warranted,172 the dissenters stressed that given the lack of
an express preemption provision in the relevant federal statute
and the long tradition of allowing room for tort actions as a
complement to federal regulation of pharmaceuticals, the
Courts preemption ruling was not what Congress would have
had in mind.173 For the dissenters, the majoritys analysis hit
the mark only in the acknowledgment that the Courts ruling
would make little sense to the plaintiffs.174 It indeed made
little sense, Justice Sotomayor remarked, to have harmed
consumers rights hinge on the happenstance of whether the
pharmacist dispensed a brand-name medication or, instead, a
generic version of it.175
E. THE TRILOGY, PART 3:MUTUAL PHARMACEUTICAL CO. V.
BARTLETT
The Supreme Court treated the third case in the
pharmaceuticals trilogy, Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v.
Bartlett,176 as if it were Mensing II. With the same five justices
who formed the Mensing majority again constituting the
majority in Bartlett,177 the Court held that federal law
preempted tort claims in which the plaintiff contended that the
generic she took was defectively designed and inadequately
171. See id. at 2582, 2586, 258788, 258990.
172. Id. at 2586 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009))
(further internal citation omitted).
173. Id. at 258687; see id. at 258385, 2591, 259293. The dissenters
would have rejected the defendants impossibility argument on the ground
that the defendants could have approached the FDA with a request for a
strengthened label and thus were able to launch a process by which a modified
label of the sort contemplated by the plaintiffs tort claims might have
resulted. See id. at 258788. Justice Sotomayor reasoned that such an
approach to the impossibility issue would have been more in keeping with the
presumption against preemption and with the demanding nature of the
impossibility defense. See id. at 258990, 259091, 2593.
174. Id. at 2583; see id. at 2582.
175. Id. at 2583 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
176. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
177. The five were Justice Alito (who wrote for the majority), Chief Justice
Roberts, and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. Id. at 2469. For the
matchingMensing lineup, see supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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labeled.178 The drug at issue was an anti-inflammatory pain
reliever commonly known as sulindac, the brand-name version
of which had received FDA approval in 1978. The plaintiff
(Bartlett) had been prescribed the brand-name medication, but
the pharmacist filled the prescription with Mutual
Pharmaceuticals generic version.179
Bartlett claimed that the drug was defectively designed
because of the risk that users of it would develop toxic
epidermal necrolysis.180 She developed this disorder and
suffered horrific consequences.181 Initially, Bartlett brought a
negligent-failure-to-warn claim in addition to her strict liability
claim for defective design.182 A federal district court dismissed
the failure-to-warn claim but permitted the design-defect claim
to go to the jury, which returned a verdict in Bartletts favor.183
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.184
Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Alito wasted little
time in concluding that Mensing foreclosed any failure-to-warn
claim in Bartlett. Even if the FDA-approved labels for sulindac
said little about the toxic epidermal necrolysis risk until after
Bartlett had already developed the disorder, her failure-to-
warn claim would have to be considered preempted on the
ground of impossibility.185 Then Justice Alito turned to
consideration of Bartletts design-defect claim under New
Hampshire lawa claim the Court characterized as serving not
only compensatory purposes but also regulatory functions.186
The Court concluded that rather than simply furnishing a basis
for an award of damages, the design-defect claim effectively
imposed a duty on drug makers to change the design of the
drug.187 However, the majority stressed, changing the
medications composition was not an option for Mutual
178. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470, 2473, 247578.
179. Id. at 2470, 247172.
180. Id. at 2472.
181. Id. Much of her body deteriorated because of severe burns and open
wounds. She also lapsed into a coma for a number of months, underwent a
dozen eye surgeries, received tube feedings for approximately a year, and
experienced various physical disabilities. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 247273, 2476. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131
S. Ct. 2567, 257481 (2011).
186. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 247374.
187. Id.
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Pharmaceutical because the Hatch-Waxman Act requires
generics to have the same composition as the relevant brand-
name versions approved earlier by the FDA.188 The Court held,
therefore, that it was impossible for the defendant to comply
with Hatch-Waxman and with a supposed duty under New
Hampshire strict liability principles to change the drugs
makeup.189
Justice Alito then noted that a drugs allegedly flawed
composition was not the only basis on which tort liability might
be based.190 Alternatively, state law contemplated that the
medication could be treated as defectively designed and
unreasonably dangerous if its manufacturer did not provide
adequate safety warnings.191 The Court reasoned that with
federal law barring the generic manufacturer from altering the
drugs makeup, the inadequate warnings avenue to liability
merited attention.192 However, assuming that the plaintiffs
strict liability claim would have obligated the generic
manufacturer to provide a stronger safety warning than it
provided, Hatch-Waxmans duty of sameness regarding generic
labels again became relevant.193 That duty barred Mutual
Pharmaceutical from modifying the FDA-approved label.194 The
Mensing rationale, therefore, controlledmeaning that
Bartletts defective-design claim, insofar as it contemplated a
strengthened warning regarding the medication, was
preempted on impossibility grounds.195
When the First Circuit upheld the jury verdict in Bartletts
favor, it rejected the defendants preemption defense by stating
that the supposed problem of impossibility could have been
avoided if Mutual Pharmaceutical had simply chosen not to
produce sulindac at all.196 The Bartlett majority rejected this
reasoning, calling the stop-selling rationale incompatible
with our preemption [decisions, which] presume that an actor
seeking to satisfy both his federal- and state-law obligations is
188. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2012); Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2475.
189. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2475.
190. Id. at 247576.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2476.
193. Id.
194. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A); Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2476 (2013).
195. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 257677, 2578; PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S.
Ct. 2567, 257481 (2011).
196. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2472, 2477.
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not required to cease acting altogether in order to avoid
liability.197 Offering concluding comments similar to those
of Justice Thomas in Mensing,198 Justice Alito acknowledged
that the plaintiffs situation is tragic and evokes deep
sympathy.199 However, the Bartlett majority concluded,
Congress had left the Court no choice but to conclude that
state-law-based tort claims contemplating actions forbidden by
federal law were preempted.200 In addition, Justice Alito noted
that the Court would welcome Congress explicit resolution of
the difficult preemption questions that arise in the prescription
drug context, because such questions had repeatedly vexed
the Courtand produced widely divergent viewsin recent
years.201
197. Id. at 2477. The Court suggested, however, that the stop-selling
argument might be treated differently if state law banned the sale of a product
(a situation not before the Court in Bartlett). According to the Court, [a]t least
where a State imposes liability based on a balancing of a products harms and
benefits in light of its labelingrather than directly prohibiting the products
salethe mere fact that a manufacturer may avoid liability by leaving the
market does not defeat a claim of impossibility. Id. at 2478 n.5 (emphasis
added).
198. See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 258182.
199. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2480.
200. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2480. The court observed, however, that it was
not address[ing] state design-defect claims that parallel the federal
misbranding statute. Id. at 2477 n.4. Under that statute, a drug is considered
misbranded if its label does not contain adequate warnings about unsafe
dosages of the medication or about unsafe methods or duration of
administration of it. 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(2) (2012). As interpreted by the FDA,
the misbranding statute obligates drug makers, even after they receive FDA
approval for their drug, to inform the FDA about newly acquired safety-
related information of a significant nature and to request FDA approval of a
strengthened label. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.57(e), 201.80(e), 314.80(b); see also
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 257677 (discussing this FDA interpretation). The
misbranding law can also obligate a manufacturer to remove its drug from the
market if newly acquired information indicate that the medication is
dangerous to consumers health even when prescribed as indicated on the
label. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(j); Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2577 n.4. The misbranding
statute did not apply in Bartlett, the Court noted, because the evidence
presented regarding sulindac was not newly acquired information that had
not been made available to the FDA. However, in commenting that it was not
addressing state law tort claims that parallel the federal misbranding statute,
the Court may have left an opening for states to recognize such parallel claims
and potentially enable plaintiffs to argue against preemption. This issue will
receive further treatment later in the article. See infra text accompanying
notes 35961, 40711, 418, 54758.
201. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2480.
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In a dissent that Justice Kagan joined, Justice Breyer
observed that complying with both federal and state duties was
not literally impossible for the defendant because it could have
either stopped selling the drug in New Hampshire or continued
to sell it, but pay money damages to plaintiffs such as
Bartlett.202 He asserted that the exercise of either option by the
defendant would not pose an impermissible obstacle to the
purposes underlying the federal drug regulation law
especially given the lack of an express preemption provision in
the federal statutory scheme.203
As she did in Mensing,204 Justice Sotomayor vehemently
dissented.205 In an opinion to which Justice Ginsburg also
subscribed, Justice Sotomayor asserted that the majority
adopted Mensings already too expansive view of impossibility
and unjustifiably extended that decisions holding to justify a
conclusion that the plaintiffs design-defect claim was
preempted.206 The Court did so, she continued, by determining
that Mutual Pharmaceutical was held liable for a failure-to-
warn claim in disguise, even though the District Court clearly
rejected such a claim and instead allowed liability on a distinct
theory.207 The majoritys attempt to lay the blame for the
outcome on Congress did not sit well with Justice Sotomayor,
who stressed that responsibility for the fact that Karen
Bartlett has been deprived of a remedy for her injuries rests
with this Court.208 She maintained that if the majority had
properly applied preemption principles209 and had correctly
202. Id. at 248082 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 2482.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 17075.
205. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2482 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
206. Id.
207. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2482. Commenting on what she regarded as a
strained attempt by the majority to turn a design-defect claim into a failure-
to-warn claim and then point to Mensing as a controlling precedent, Justice
Sotomayor characterized Bartlett as relying on an unwarranted and incorrect,
though unspoken, assumption that federal law gives pharmaceutical
companies a right to sell a federally approved drug free from common-law
liability. Id. at 2483; see id. at 2491. She maintained that given the lack of an
express preemption provision in the federal drug regulation laws and the
presence of other indications that Congress did not intend to remove state-
law-based tort claims from the regulatory picture, Bartletts preemption
holding was unsound. Id. at 248485.
208. Id. at 2483; see id. at 2496.
209. Id. at 2483, 248586, 249495. In particular, Justice Sotomayor noted
that the Court failed to take into account the usual presumption against
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interpreted New Hampshire law, Bartletts design-defect claim
would have escaped preemption.210
II. THE PHARMACEUTICALS TRILOGY: ANALYSIS AND
FEDERAL REACTIONS
A. ASSESSING THE THREE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The three decisions discussed above reveal a Court deeply
divided over whether juries in tort cases should be able to
second-guess the FDA after the agency has approved a drug.
The dissenters in Wyeth v. Levine lost the initial battle, as the
Court held that the plaintiffs failure-to-warn claim against the
manufacturer of a brand-name drug approved by the FDA was
not preempted.211 But in the next two battles (Mensing and
Bartlett), the Levine dissenters helped to form a majority for
rulings that held tort claims against manufacturers of generics
to be preempted.212 As a practical matter, the justices in the
Mensing-Bartlett majority made significant strides toward
winning the larger war over whether tort claims against drug
makers should be permitted at all.213 Because pharmacists fill
prescriptions with generics far more often than with brand-
preemption, the lack of an express preemption provision in the relevant
federal drug regulation laws, and indications that Congress envisioned state-
law-based tort actions as playing a complementary drug-regulation role. Id. at
248385, 249196.
210. See id. at 248692. Justice Sotomayor contended that the majority
misinterpreted New Hampshire law regarding strict liability claims of the
design-defect variety by concluding that such claims would effectively require
the generic manufacturer to change the drugs composition or label. No such
requirement stemmed from the relevant state tort law, she argued. Id. at
248687, 248889. She observed that a tort claim of the sort at issue in the
case creates an incentive for drug manufacturers to make changes to its
product . . . to try to avoid liability, but such an incentive and the possible
exposure to liability for damages do not amount to a legal mandate to change
the drugs composition or label. Id. at 2488. In Justice Sotomayors view,
[t]his difference is significant one: A mandate leaves no choice for a party
that wishes to comply with the law, whereas an incentive may only influence a
choice. Id.Without such a mandate under state law, the Courts argument for
impossibility preemption does not get off the ground. Id. at 2489.
211. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 55859, 57173, 581 (2009).
212. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2572 (2011); Bartlett, 133 S.
Ct. at 2470, 2473, 247578.
213. See John H. Beisner et al., Supreme Courts Bartlett Decision
Reaffirms Broad Scope of Generic Drug Preemption, SKADDEN (June 24,
2013), https://www.skadden.com/insights/supreme-courts-bartlett-decision-
reaffirms-broad-scope-generic-drug-preemption.
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name drugs, the outcomes in Mensing and Bartlett mean that
for most harmed consumers, a tort claim is likely to be
prohibited.214
The Mensing-Bartlett tandem clearly signals that
consumers who are harmed by a prescription medication and
want to pursue a legal remedy must hope that they received a
brand-name drug rather than a generic. As Justice Sotomayor
put it in her Mensing dissent, the happenstance of what the
pharmacist dispensed now has a potentially determinative
effect on the harmed patients ability to obtain legal
recourse.215 Her accurate observation suggests that analytical
soundness became a casualty as the war over the fate of tort
claims progressed. How could it be likely that Congress would
envision a legal regime in which a patients rights would hinge
on a pharmacists decision on which one of two identical drugs
to dispense? Before further exploration of what Congress
presumably would or would not have wanted regarding
generics, however, it is necessary to trace how the
happenstance factor acquired such significance.
In Levine, the five justices in the majority invoked familiar
principles of preemption analysis in concluding that federal
lawin particular, the fact of FDA approvaldid not preempt
the plaintiffs failure-to-warn claim against the brand-name
manufacturer.216 They provided a reminder that the purpose of
Congress is the ultimate touchstone in deciding whether
preemption is warranted.217 They applied the presumption
against preemption, in light of the absence of a clear indication
of congressional intent that preemption would be
appropriate.218 Moreover, they ascribed considerable
significance to the lack of an express preemption provision in
the relevant federal drug regulation laws and contrasted that
absence with the presence of such a provision in the statutes
dealing with medical devices.219 Finally, they highlighted
longstanding indications that Congress regarded tort claims
under state law as complementary to FDA regulation of
214. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 258082; see supra text accompanying notes 8
9.
215. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2583 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
216. See Levine, 555 U.S. at 56569, 57174.
217. Levine, 555 U.S. at 565 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
485 (1996)).
218. Id.; see supra note 104 (discussing presumption against preemption).
219. Levine, 555 U.S. at 56364, 567, 574.
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drugs.220 All of these considerations pertained to the purposes-
and-objectives form of preemption, which the defendant sought
but the Court declined to apply.221
The Levine majority also addressed impossibility
preemption, an appropriate subject of analysis because the
defendant had argued in the alternative for preemption on that
basis. As noted earlier, the Court rejected the defendants
impossibility argument because the changes-being-effected
(CBE) regulation enabled brand-name manufacturers such as
the defendant to begin using, without prior FDA approval, a
revised label with a stronger warning if later-acquired
information indicated a need for it.222 Justice Thomas declined
to join the majority opinion because it discussed purposes-and-
objectives preemptiona preemption basis of which he
categorically disapproves because he sees it as potentially
leading to judicial flights of fancy.223 However, he concurred in
the judgment, agreeing with the basic point that the defendant
could not succeed with its impossibility argument.224 The three
dissenters, of course, regarded preemption as appropriate and
objected to the notion that a jury in a tort case might effectively
second-guess the FDA.225
The attention paid in Levine to the impossibility argument
was both appropriate and understandable, but it provided an
opening that led to the contrary preemption holdings in
Mensing and Bartlett. Having unsuccessfully argued for
preemption of the plaintiffs failure-to-warn claim against the
brand-name manufacturer in Levine, the dissenters in that
case (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito)226
could hardly have been expected to oppose preemption of the
same type of claim against a generic manufacturer. InMensing,
therefore, they found the impossibility rationale appealing and
220. Id. at 567, 57475, 57879.
221. Id. at 57379.
222. Id. at 56870. For discussion of the CBE regulation and its relevance
to Levine, see supra text accompanying notes 4547, 10912; see also supra
note 111 and accompanying text.
223. See Levine, 555 U.S. at 583 (Thomas, J., concurring).
224. Id. at 58283.
225. See id. at 604, 60626 (Alito, J., dissenting).
226. See id.
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saw the Hatch-Waxman Acts duty of sameness as a
convenient path to a conclusion of impossibility.227
Justice Thomas, who had concurred in the judgment in
Levine but wrote the majority opinion in Mensing, no doubt
regarded the impossibility rationale as desirable because
focusing on it drew attention away from issues associated with
the purposes-and-objectives form of preemption.228 He opposes
most inquiries into whether preemption should or should not
take place based on what Congress intended, because he sees
too much potential that courts would not remain tethered to
actual statutory language in deciding on supposed
congressional purposes. In Justice Thomass view, courts
conducting preemption analyses should determine
congressional purposes purely from consideration of the
statutory language.229 Insofar as it set up a duty of sameness
regarding generics, Hatch-Waxmans language enabled Justice
Thomas to answer the impossibility question with a yes in
Mensing even though he provided a no answer in Levine.230
The emphasis on supposed impossibility in light of the duty of
sameness evidently was enough to convince Justice Kennedy,
who had been part of the Levine majority, to add a fifth vote for
preemption in Mensing.231 The same majority then held
together in Bartlett.232
The FDA helped the Mensing majority reach its
impossibility conclusion by taking the position that generic
manufacturers could not use the CBE regulations avenue to
use of a strengthened label. The Court could then conveniently
defer to this FDA interpretation233 and maintain that the
holding in Mensing was not inconsistent with Levine despite
the two decisions different outcomes.234
227. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2012); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct.
2567, 2575 (2011).
228. See Levine, 555 U.S. at 583 (Thomas, J. concurring).
229. See Levine, 555 U.S. at 588, 595, 598601; see also Meltzer, supra note
86, at 25, 35 (analyzing Justice Thomass textualist approach to preemption).
230. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 257475, 257779, 258081; see Levine, 555
U.S. at 58283 (Thomas, J., concurring).
231. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2572; see Levine, 555 U.S. at 557.
232. SeeMut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2469 (2013).
233. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 257576.
234. See id. at 2581. The brand-name manufacturers ability to utilize the
CBE avenue had been among the reasons why, in Levine, the plaintiffs
failure-to-warn claim was not preempted. See Levine, 555 U.S. at 56870. In a
November 2013 proposed regulation, the FDA outlined a proposal to allow
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However, the route to finding impossibility in Mensing was
not otherwise smooth or clear-cut. In another position advanced
by the FDAone that was potentially more favorable to
plaintiffs wishing to pursue tort claimsthe agency asserted
that all drug manufacturers (generic manufacturers included)
have an ongoing safety duty to propose strengthened warnings
to the FDA if they acquire important safety-related information
after the relevant drug label received FDA approval.235 The
Court declined to defer to this FDA interpretation but went on
to note that even if it were assumed to be correct, it would not
make a difference in the impossibility analysis.236 The plaintiffs
and the FDA contended that the defendant should not be able
to argue impossibility because, in failing to fulfill a supposed
federal duty to request FDA approval of an enhanced label, the
defendant had not even tried to launch a proceeding that could
have led to a stronger label of the sort contemplated by the tort
claim at issue.237 This was a fair argument, the Court
generic manufacturers to rely on the CBE regulation. Supplemental
Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological
Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 6798587 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt.
314, 601). Under the current CBE regulation, as interpreted by the FDA,
brand-name manufacturers may begin using a strengthened warning label
without the FDAs prior approval if later-acquired safety information
warrants using such a revised label. See supra text accompanying notes 45
47. Although FDA approval of the revised label would ultimately be necessary,
the approval could come after the revised label has been put into use. See id.
The proposed FDA regulation would open up the CBA avenue to generic
manufacturers as well. 78 Fed. Reg. 67985, 6798687. If the proposed
regulation were to become a final rule, it presumably would undercut the
stated impossibility rationale in Mensing, see Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 257475,
257779, 258081, and would help support arguments that a failure-to-warn
case against a generic manufacturer should escape preemption under a
Levine-like rationale. See Levine, 555 U.S. at 56870. If the proposed FDA
regulation were promulgated and the Court again had to decide a failure-to-
warn case against a generic manufacturer, a ruling of preemption seemingly
would not result unless the Court put a questionable gloss on its Mensing
reasoning, overruled Levine or recast its reasoning, or ruled that the
regulation unreasonably interpreted governing statutes. Moreover, if
Mensings rationale took a hit, the reasoning in Bartlett would be significantly
undermined as well. It is important to note, however, that the proposed
regulation has remained just thatproposedfor a significant length of time
and that its ultimate status is uncertain. See infra note 268.
235. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2576, 257879. The FDA based this supposed
duty on the federal misbranding statute. See supra text accompanying notes
4853.
236. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 257779.
237. Id. at 2579.
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conceded,238 but it failed because the mere filing of a request for
authority to use a modified label would not have guaranteed
that a stronger label would in fact result.239 According to the
Court, the fact that FDA approval would be necessary meant
that the generic manufacturer could not independentlyi.e.,
by acting purely on its ownsatisfy both its federal duty to use
the previously approved label and its state-law obligation to
use a stronger label.240
In order to dispose of the plaintiffs fair argument that
impossibility was not present, the Mensing majority added the
independent action element to the analysis and thereby
broadened the impossibility doctrine in a pro-defendant way.241
As the four dissenters pointed out, this action by the Court
softened the demanding nature of the impossibility defense.242
The Court also ignored the familiar presumption against
preemption and paid little attention to the traditional notion
that Congress regarded common law tort actions as a
complement to the federal drug regulation regime.243 These
almost certainly deliberate omissions appear consistent with
Justice Thomass desire to keep the focus on impossibility
issues and avoid a foray into anything that might resemble a
purposes-and-objectives inquiry.244
238. Id.
239. Id. at 2578.
240. Id. at 2580; see id. at 2579, 258081.
241. See id. at 258990 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
242. See id. at 2582, 258690.
243. See id. at 258687. In an apparent effort to eliminate the traditional
presumption against preemption, Justice Thomas devoted a section of his
opinion to an argument subscribed to by only four justices (himself included).
According to this argument, the Supremacy Clause in the U.S. Constitution
amounts to a non obstante provision that impliedly repeals state laws if they
conflict with federal law. Id. at 257980. Because of this supposed non
obstante provision, he continued, courts should not strain to find ways to
reconcile federal law with seemingly conflicting state law. Id. at 2580. Justice
Kennedy did not join this section of the opinion. See id. at 2572. Justice
Thomass non obstante trial balloon, therefore, did not command a majority of
the Court. For discussion of problems with the non obstante argument and the
effects it could produce if it were to be adopted by the Supreme Court, see
Meltzer, supra note 86, at 45, 89, 35, 4552. See also Young, supra note 86,
at 31020, 32528 (examining problems with non obstante argument).
244. See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 257779, 258182. For discussion of Justice
Thomass opposition to the types of inquiries associated with purposes-and-
objectives preemption (obstacle preemption), see supra text accompanying
notes 22324, 22829.
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The omissions from the Mensing analysis also suggest that
Justice Sotomayor offered a partially valid criticism when, in
her dissent, she charged the majority with seeking to rewrite
the decision in Levine.245 Because Levine involved a brand-
name manufacturer and Mensing involved a generic
manufacturer subject to a special set of statutes, the Mensing
majority did not literally rewrite Levine.246 But to the extent
that the majority opinion in Mensing ignored or paid little
attention to key features of the decision issued only two years
earlier, Mensing made certain that Levines lessons about
purposes-and-objectives analysis would not be heeded.247 In a
practical sense, moreover, Mensing effectively rewrote the tort
liability rules for most harmed consumers, because far more
receive generics than receive brand-name drugs when their
prescriptions are filled.248
After Mensings preemption ruling, the same five-justice
majority took what it regarded as the next logical step: holding,
in Bartlett, that the duty of sameness applicable to generics
necessitated preemption of the plaintiffs design-defect claim
against the generic manufacturer.249 The Bartlett outcome
should not have been seen as foreordained by Mensing,
however. To shoehorn Bartlett into the impossibility rationale
applied in Mensing, the Court misconstrued the nature and
effects of New Hampshire tort law.
Justice Alito, writing for the Bartlett majority, launched
the misconstruction by characterizing the plaintiffs design-
defect claim as contemplating a requirement that the
defendant change the composition of the drug at issue.250
Changing the drugs composition, however, was not something
the defendant, as a generic manufacturer, could do without
violating the Hatch-Waxman Act.251 Justice Alito then
reasoned that impossibility preemption barred the design-
defect claim insofar as it would necessitate an altered design
for the drug.252
245. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2582 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
246. Cf. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 258283.
247. SeeWyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 56369, 57479 (2009).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 89; see also supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
249. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 247578 (2013).
250. See id. at 257375.
251. See id. at 2471.
252. Id. at 2575; see id. at 2471.
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However, in asserting that the design-defect claim
effectively required a change in the drugs makeup, the Court
ascribed a false effect to the claim and overlooked the
important compensatory function of tort actions. Such claims
are meant to allow compensation for plaintiffs who have
experienced harm as a result of defendants violations of legal
duties.253 Until Mensing and Bartlett, that function had been
seen as compatible with FDA regulation of pharmaceuticals.254
Of course, a defendant held liable in a design-defect case may
have an incentive to change the drugs compositionsomething
a generic manufacturer could not do and something the name-
brand manufacturer could do only with FDA approval. As
Justice Sotomayor pointed out in her Bartlett dissent, however,
an incentive furnished by state law does not amount to a
requirement under state law.255 Only when state law requires
what federal law prohibits should impossibility apply.256
The Bartlett majoritys misinterpretation of the design-
defect claims effect also led the Court to identify two
alternative but problematic steps that state law was calling
upon the generic manufacturer to take. According to the Court,
the generic manufacturer either would have to change the
drugs composition (as supposedly required by state tort law) or
stop selling the drug.257 The Court reasoned that the former
was barred by the Hatch-Waxman Actthus calling
impossibility into playand that the latter, as a matter of
public policy, was not a route generic manufacturer should be
expected to take in order to avoid running afoul of conflicting
federal and state requirements.258 This either-or, however,
amounted to a false alternative because changing the drugs
makeup was not required by state common law (as noted
253. See id. at 248182 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 248485 (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting).
254. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2482 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 248485
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 57475 (2009).
Tort law has the ability to fill the gaps in federal regulation by [helping to]
identify previously unknown drug dangers. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2485.
Moreover, preserving an appropriate role for such common law claims may be
especially important because the federal drug regulation laws do not include a
provision granting a private right of action to consumers harmed by unsafe
drugs. See Levine, 555 U.S. at 574.
255. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2488 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 2489.
257. Id. at 247475, 2477 (majority opinion).
258. Id. at 2475, 247778.
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above) and because there was another option the Court did not
identify. Under that option, the generic manufacturer could
continue to sell the drug as designed but pay damages to
harmed plaintiffs who could prove the elements of their tort
claims. As Justice Breyer noted and Justice Sotomayor
suggested in their respective dissents in Bartlett, that option
would not call for the defendant to violate the Hatch-Waxman
Act and would respect the compensatory role that tort lawsuits
have traditionally played.259 The Bartlett majoritys failure to
consider this middle-ground option led Justice Sotomayor to
observe derisively, but not without foundation, that the
majority appeared to regard generic manufacturers as being
entitled to an unfettered right to sell their products without
any risk of tort liability.260
Continuing the shoehorning of Bartlett into the
impossibility rationale of Mensing, Justice Alito again
examined New Hampshire tort law and concluded that it would
permit strict liability claims of the design-defect variety when
unreasonable dangerousness stemmed from the product itself
or from the absence of adequate warnings.261 Because it had
already concluded that a design-defect claim premised on the
drugs composition and harmful side-effects would require the
generic manufacturer to change the drugs makeup and thus
could not go forward in light of Hatch-Waxman,262 the Court
reasoned that only the inadequate-warnings avenue to design-
defect liability remained. This meant, as Justice Alito
explained, that the plaintiffs claim had to be treated as a
failure-to-warn claim.263 Enter Mensing and, again, Hatch-
Waxman, this time its provision requiring generic drugs to bear
the same label approved by the FDA for the relevant brand-
name version. The Court concluded, therefore, that the
impossibility rationale applied and that the plaintiffs claim in
Bartlett, treated as if it were a failure-to warn claim, was every
bit as preempted as the actual failure-to-warn claim in
Mensing.264
259. Id. at 248081, 2482 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see id. at 248485, 2486
87, 249294 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 2491, 2494.
261. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 247475.
262. Id. at 247375.
263. Id. at 2474, 247576.
264. Id. at 247677, 2478, 247980. In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor
criticized the majority for unwisely extend[ing] its preemption holding in
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As noted earlier, the Court expressed sympathy for the
severely harmed plaintiffs in both Mensing and Bartlett,
acknowledging in Mensing that Congress had dealt them an
unfortunate hand, and offering comments of a similar nature
in Bartlett.265 In emphasizing that Congress supposedly had
dictated the outcome through the provisions contained in
Hatch-Waxman, the Court suggested that congressional or
FDA action to change the governing legal rules might lead to
different outcomes in future cases against generic
manufacturers.266 But such congressional action seems highly
unlikely,267 and the prospects of corrective action by FDA
remain uncertain at best.268 The Courts blame-it-on-Congress
Mensing through the questionable device of concluding that the defendant had
been held liable for a failure-to-warn claim in disguise, even though the [trial
court] clearly rejected such a claim and instead allowed liability on a distinct
theory. Id. at 2482 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
265. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2478, 2480; PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S.
Ct. 2567, 2581 (2011).
266. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2480;Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 258182.
267. In the current political environment, attempts to overturn Mensing
and Bartlett legislatively would seem doomed to failure. Bills meant to have
such an effect have died amid opposition in Congress. See Jordan Paradise,
FDAs Proposed Changes to Generic Drug Label Rules Questioned by Members
of Congress, HEALTH REFORM WATCH (Jan. 29, 2014),
http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2014/01/29/fdas-proposed-changes-to-
generic-drug-label-rules-questioned-by-members-of-congress/. Moreover, it is a
rare occasion when Congress enacts a statute that overturns a Supreme Court
decision in which the Court ruled in favor of preemption. Meltzer, supra note
86, at 18, 40. Commentators have proposed new statutory frameworks that
are interesting, see, e.g., Lee, supra note 8, at 24558, but the odds that
Congress would scuttle or rework the existing laws seem remote.
268. Although they may be somewhat greater than the chances of
congressional action, the chances of FDA action that would negate Mensing
and Bartlett fall far short of a sure thing. In November 2013, the FDA
announced a proposed regulation that, if promulgated, would allow generic
manufacturers to rely on the CBE regulationa regulation currently
available only to brand-name manufacturers. See supra text accompanying
notes 4547; supra note 234 and accompanying text. For discussion of the
proposed regulation and of other rulemaking avenues that might be
promising, see Marie Boyd, Unequal Protection Under the Law: Why FDA
Should Use Negotiated Rulemaking to Reform the Regulation of Generic
Drugs, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1525, 152728, 154154 (2014). If the proposed
regulation were to become a final rule, it could have a significant effect on
generic manufacturers tort liability. The proposed regulation remains stalled,
however. The usual comment period, originally set to run through mid-
January, 2014, expired long ago. See Supplemental Applications Proposing
Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg.
67985, 67985 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314, 601).
Eventually the FDA reopened the comment period and extended it to April 27,
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2015. See Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for
Approved Drugs and Biological Products; Public Meeting; Request for
Comments; Reopening of the Comment Period, 80 Fed. Reg. 8577 (proposed
Feb. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314, 601). In addition, the FDA
announced and then conducted a March 2015 public meeting at which
comments on the proposed regulation and alternatives to it could be offered.
See id. No further developments have occurred as of this writing. As would be
expected, harmed consumers and interest groups aligned with them have
offered comments favoring the proposed regulation. See Alliance for Justice et
al., Comments to FDA on Generic Drugs and Industry Proposal, CTR. FOR
JUST. & DEMOCRACY (Apr. 20, 2015), https://centerjd.org/content/comments-
fda-generic-drugs-and-industry-proposal (including comments of Alliance for
Justice, Center for Justice & Democracy, Connecticut Center for Patient
Safety, Mothers Against Medical Error, New Yorkers for Patient & Family
Empowerment, Public Justice, and Texas Watch); Sabriya Rice, Generic drug
makers await FDA decision on labeling regulation, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Mar.
14, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140314/NEWS
/303149917. Some members of Congress have also expressed their support for
the FDAs proposed action. Id.; Kurt R. Karst, Generic Drug Labeling
Preemption: The Flavor of the Day, FDA L. BLOG (Mar. 10, 2014),
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2014/03/generic-drug-
labeling-preemption-the-flavor-of-the-day.html. As would also be expected,
however, generic manufacturers, having received largely a free pass from the
Mensing-Bartlett tandem in regard to potential tort liability, have objected to
the proposed regulation and have advocated alternative proposals. See
Paradise, supra note 267; Scott Gottlieb, Alex Brill & Robert W. Pollock,
Proposed FDA Generic Drug Regulation: Higher Prices, No Public Health
Benefit, AM. ENTER. INST. (Mar. 12, 2014),
https://www.aei.org/publication/proposed-fda-generic-drug-regulation-higher-
prices-no-public-health-benefit/. They have also signaled that they would
oppose the proposed regulation in other ways if it were promulgated in the
proposed versions form. For instance, some generic manufacturers have said
they would challenge any such final rule in court, on the ground that the rule
would go beyond the FDAs statutory authority. Alexander Gaffney, Generic
Drug Industry Threatens FDA With Lawsuit Over Drug Labeling Proposal,
REG. AFF. PROF. SOC.Y (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-
Focus/News/2014/10/07/20497/Generic-Drug-Industry-Threatens-FDA-With-
Lawsuit-Over-Drug-Labeling-Proposal/. Moreover, some in Congress have
expressed concern about the whether such a rule would fall within the FDAs
authority. Paradise, supra note 267; Alexander Gaffney, FDA Reopens Debate
Over Major Generic Drug Labeling Rule, REG. AFF. PROF. SOCY (Feb. 17,
2015), http://raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2015/02/17/21361/FDA-Reopens-
Debate-Over-Major-Generic-Drug-Labeling-Rule/ [hereinafter FDA Reopens
Debate]. Given the opposition in influential quarters to the proposed rule, the
legal challenges that could follow its promulgation, and the FDAs solicitation
of further comments regarding not only the proposed rule but also possible
alternatives, the proposed regulation, at least in its original form, may no
longer be as high a priority for the FDA as it was when it was announced. See
FDA Reopens Debate. In its portion of the legally required announcement of
regulatory agendas that federal agencies released in December 2015, the FDA
still listed the proposed regulation on its agenda. See Introduction to the
Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, 80 Fed. Reg.
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observations, moreover, had a forced tone. Given the analytical
gymnastics employed in Bartlett in order to bring the case
within Mensingwhich itself involved a pro-defendant
broadening of the impossibility doctrinethe Court reached
conclusions not compelled by anything Congress had done.269
In issuing its preemption rulings in Mensing and Bartlett,
the Court paid heed to the language of Hatch-Waxman and to
the majority justices supposed understanding of what state
tort law contemplated.270 But with the purpose of Congress
being the ultimate touchstone in determinations of whether
preemption is warranted,271 the Court needed to pay attention
not only to what Congress said in substantive Hatch-Waxman
provisions but also to what Congress did not say. In addition,
proper consideration should have been given to the context in
which Congress added Hatch-Waxman to the federal drug
regulation laws.
Regarding what Congress did not say, the most important
thing to note is the absence of an express preemption provision
in the federal statutes pertaining to brand-name and generic
drugs.272 The fact that Congress did not include such a
provision was appropriately a point of emphasis in Levine as
the Court rejected the defendants preemption arguments,273
but was essentially glossed over in Mensing and Bartlett as the
Court strained to justify its preemption holdings.274 Of course,
77709 (Dec. 15, 2015); Introduction to the 2015 U.S. Regulatory Plan, HHS-
FDA 40 Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved
Drugs and Biological Products, 80 Fed. Reg. 77770 (Dec. 15, 2015). However,
the FDA noted that it was considering several alternatives described in
comments submitted to the public docket established for the proposed rule.
Id. at 77771. The FDAs regulatory agenda also mentioned July 2016 as a
target date for a final rule, id., but the agencys slow pace thus far suggest
that there may be further delays beyond July 2016. It also seems fair to
assume that if an alternative version of the proposed regulation would
ultimately achieve final rule status, the alternative version probably would
have far less effect on preemption analysis than the proposed regulation might
have had.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 15775, 185210.
270. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 247071, 247376
(2013);Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 257475, 257778.
271. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (internal citation
omitted).
272. Id. at 563.
273. Id. at 563, 567, 574.
274. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2480 (2013). See generally Mensing, 131
S. Ct. at 258283 (2011) (Sotomayor, J, dissenting) (a plurality of the Court
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the Court was correct when it observed that an express
preemption clause is not essential in order for preemption to be
held appropriate,275 but the lack of such a provision should be a
strong indicator of a lack of preemptive purpose on the part of
Congress when the context suggests that the omission was
deliberate.
Congress has included an express preemption provision in
certain statutes dealing with medical matters, most notably in
the laws under which the FDA regulates and approves medical
devices.276 It has also included an express preemption clause in
a special set of statutes dealing with FDA-approved vaccines
and setting up a compensation fund for vaccine recipients who
experienced harm.277 Given these related settings in which
Congress has put an express preemption clause in the relevant
statutes, the lack of such a clause in the drug regulation laws
suggests a deliberate decision by Congress to leave it out.
Under the circumstances, the absence of an express preemption
clause should have been treated, as it was in Levine, as a
strong indicator of a congressional purpose that there should be
room in the regulatory picture for state-law-based tort
actions.278
After the Mensing-Bartlett tandem, however, a
preemption-either-way message has emerged. There seems
little doubt that if there had been an express preemption
provision in the drug regulation laws, the Court would have
found the tort claims preempted, as it did in a leading case
dealing with tort claims against the manufacturer of an FDA-
tosses aside our repeated admonition that courts should hesitate to conclude
that Congress intended to pre-empt state laws governing health and safety.).
275. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2480;Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2577 n.5.
276. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2012). For discussion of the medical device statutes
and the Supreme Courts key decisions on whether FDA approval of a device
preempts tort claims pertaining to it, see supra notes 9394 and
accompanying text.
277. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1) (2012). In Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC,
parents of a child allegedly harmed by a vaccine rejected what they could have
recovered under the no-fault compensation program set up by the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (NCVIA). Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct.
1068, 107076 (2011). Instead, they brought a design-defect tort claim against
the vaccines manufacturer. A six-justice majority of the Supreme Court held
that although the NCVIAs above-cited express preemption clause did not
preempt all tort claims, it preempted the plaintiffs design-defect claim. Id. at
107582.
278. SeeWyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 563, 567, 574 (2009).
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approved medical device.279 In Mensing and Bartlett, the Court
opted for preemption despite the conspicuous absence of an
express preemption clause.280 The resulting lesson has a
heads, I win; tails, you lose feel to it.
In its Mensing-Bartlett focus on the Hatch-Waxman Acts
requirements regarding generics, the Court did not address
three key questions that should have been important in the
preemption analysis. First, in Hatch-Waxman, did Congress
really intend to deprive harmed consumers of the ability to
bring tort actions if they happened to receive a generic version
of a drug rather than the brand-name version? Second, if
Congress had such an intent (which seems unlikely), wouldnt
it have said something to that effect rather than relying on the
hope that courts at some later point would say such claims are
impliedly preempted? Third, would Congress have wanted
Hatch-Waxmans duty of sameness to be interpreted as the
Court did in construing the statute to require sameness
regarding drug composition and drug label,281 but not
regarding potential liability for harm caused? These
overlapping questions merit attention here.
279. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 31718, 32226, 330 (2008). As
noted previously, the Court held in Riegel that the medical device statutes
express preemption clause bars tort claims against the maker of an FDA-
approved device if the device underwent the FDAs highest level of review for
safety and effectiveness. Id. at 32728. See supra note 93 and accompanying
text. However, if the device underwent only the lower-level review for
substantial equivalence to a pre-1976 device, the express preemption clause
does not preempt tort claims against the devices manufacturer. Riegel, 552
U.S. at 32223; Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 49294, 50001 (1996);
see supra note 94 and accompanying text.
280. In so holding, the Court created an interesting inconsistency
regarding the rights of certain consumers who experienced harm as a result of
taking or using a product regulated by the FDA. If the harm-causing product
was a medical device and the device only had to undergo the lower-level
substantial equivalence review rather than the rigorous safety-and-
effectiveness review contemplated by the pre-market approval process, the
plaintiffs tort claims are not preempted. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 32223; Lohr, 518
U.S. at 49294, 50001. However, if the harm-causing product was a generic
drug, whose manufacturer only has to demonstrate equivalence to a brand-
name drug (as opposed to completing the rigorous safety-and-effectiveness
review contemplated by the new drug approval process), the plaintiffs tort
claims face preemption. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2470,
2471, 2473, 247578 (2013); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2572,
257475, 257779, 258182 (2011).
281. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2471;Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 257475, 2577.
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Hatch-Waxman appears to have been prompted by pro-
consumer and promotion-of-competition concerns.282 By
exempting generics from the time-consuming, extensive, and
expensive showings required for safety and effectiveness
purposes in the new drug approval process, Congress could
enhance the likelihood that generics would in fact be brought to
market and would be lower-priced than brand-name drugs.283
That state of affairs presumably would be good for consumers.
In addition, competition would be enhanced and brand-name
manufacturers would be less likely to have de facto monopoly
positions in the market even after their patents expired.284 By
requiring a showing of equivalence to the relevant brand-name
medications and by requiring generics to have the same label
as the brand-name label previously approved by the FDA,
Congress could instill public confidence in generics and lessen
consumers possible concerns that generics might not be as safe
or effective as brand-name drugs.285 Again, consumers
presumably would benefit.
With Hatch-Waxman being a pro-consumer enactment in
the senses noted above, it seems unlikely that Congress would
have intended the anti-consumer results reached through the
Mensing and Bartlett holdings that barred harmed consumers
tort claims. Neither does it seem likely that Congress would
use Hatch-Waxman to promote broader use of generics but
stealthily seek to deny consumers access to the courts if they
experienced harm as a result of such use. Mensing and Bartlett,
however, achieved results consistent with that unlikely
scenario.
From a promotion-of-competition perspective, Hatch-
Waxman bears the mark of a Congress willing to ease a costly
regulatory burden on generic manufacturers in order to enable
them to compete more effectively with brand-name
manufacturers.286 It does not seem likely, however, that
Congress had in mind a state of affairs under which generic
manufacturers not only would have their regulatory approval
costs slashed in comparison with those of brand-name
282. See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2223, 222526 (2013) (noting
the Hatch-Waxman Acts general procompetitive thrust).
283. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2471;Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574.
284. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2471;Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574.
285. See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574.
286. See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2223, 222526 (2013).
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manufacturers, but would also receive the benefit of an
exemption from the tort liability that brand-name
manufacturers could still face. Even a Congress inclined to
improve the competitive prospects of generics would not have
been inclined to give generic manufacturers such a double
benefit, whose effect could tilt the competitive playing field
markedly against brand-name manufacturers. Again, however,
the interpretations of Hatch-Waxman in Mensing and Bartlett
are consistent with that unlikely prospect.287 Then there is the
happenstance problem.288 Whatever one thinks of Congress
generally or of the wisdom (or lack thereof) underlying
particular enactments, it is hard to believe that in an extensive
and detailed statutory treatment of drugs subject to federal
regulation, Congress would have envisioned hinging important
consumer rights on whether the harm-causing drug was a
brand-name medication or its generic twin. But after Mensing-
Bartlett, an arbitrary factorwhich one did the pharmacist
choose?effectively controls.289
Despite the analytical flaws in Mensing and Bartlett, lower
courts by and large are stuck with the two decisions, which
appear to contemplate broad preemptive effect regarding tort
claims against generic manufacturers.290 Interestingly,
however, Mensing and Bartlett offer possible hints that lower
courts could try to seize upon in an effort to justify rulings that
certain claims should survive preemption. In Mensing, Justice
Thomass majority opinion noted that because the events in the
case pre-dated 2007, the Court was not considering the effect, if
any, of certain 2007 statutory amendments.291 Those
amendments gave the FDA the authority to order the use of a
particular revised warning label if later-acquired safety
information warranted such a label.292 The pre-2007 legal rule
applicable to such a situation only permitted the FDA to seek
287. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2471 (2013); PLIVA,
Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 257475, 2577 (2011).
288. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2583, 2592 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
289. See id. at 258182.
290. This is especially true of Bartlett, in which the Court did not hesitate
to re-mold the design-defect claim into a failure-to-warn claim that would
more readily fit within the rationale articulated in Mensing. See supra text
accompanying notes 185210.
291. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574 n.1. The 2007 amendments presumably
did not play a role in the Bartlett analysis, because that cases events also pre-
dated 2007. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2472.
292. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4) (2012).
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the brand-name manufacturers agreement on the text of a
particular revised label.293 What, if anything, to make of that
possible hint is uncertain, but it affords possibilities.
The Bartlett majority opinion also contained a possible
hint, as Justice Alito observed in a footnote that the Court was
not expressing any view on whether state-law-based tort claims
that parallel the federal misbranding statute should escape
preemption.294 As noted earlier, that statute sets up a post-
approval duty on the part of drug makers to make certain that
their drugs bear adequate warnings about important safety
concerns.295 Justice Alito thus suggested, without further
elaboration and clearly without committing the Court, that
certain appropriately crafted tort claims might not be
preempted. He was quick to note, however, that Bartlett did not
involve any such parallel claim.296
As the following subsection will reveal, lower federal courts
have tended to interpret Mensing and Bartlett as calling for
sweeping preemption rulings regarding harmed consumers tort
claims against generic manufacturers. For the most part, the
federal courts have not been inclined to pursue possible leads
that the above-mentioned hints might suggest.297 Various state
courts, however, have interpreted Mensing and Bartlett
somewhat less broadly. In addition, state courts have been
more inclined than the federal courts to exploit the previously
noted hints and other possible avenues for limiting the
applicability of Mensing and Bartlett and allowing some tort
claims against generic manufacturers to go forward. The state
court decisions will be discussed and analyzed in Sections IV
and V of the Article.298
B. FEDERAL COURTS APPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURTS
PHARMACEUTICALS DECISIONS
Soundly reasoned or not, Mensing and Bartlett must be
respected, of course, by lower federal courts and state courts. In
federal courts, that respect has consistently led to decisions in
293. SeeWyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 567, 571 (2009).
294. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2477 n.4 (2013).
295. See supra text accompanying notes 4853.
296. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2477 n.4. For discussion of possible parallel
claims, see Catherine M. Sharkey, Tort-Agency Partnerships in an Age of
Preemption, 15 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 359, 36368 (2014).
297. See infra text accompanying notes 32124.
298. See infra text accompanying notes 337604.
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which plaintiffs tort claims against generic manufacturers
were held preempted. If the gist of the plaintiffs claims is that
the generic maker should have provided a stronger warning
than the approved label furnished, the federal courts of appeal
have invoked Mensing as controlling and have held the claims
to be preempted on the ground of impossibility.299 This has
been so regardless of how the claims were denominated. If a
claim styled as a negligence, strict liability, or breach of
implied warranty claim had a failure-to-warn essence, it could
not go forward.300 Similarly, the courts of appeal have
consistently held that claims amounting to design-defect
claimsregardless of the label given to them by the plaintiffs
are preempted under the Bartlett reasoning.301
Strayhorn v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc.302 serves as a
useful example. There, the Sixth Circuit observed that various
circuits have interpreted Mensing to broadly preempt claims
that are, at their core, claims that the generic manufacturer
failed to provide additional warnings beyond that which was
required by federal law of the brand-name manufacturers.303
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs various claims,
including negligence, breach of implied warranty, and other
supposed causes of action under Tennessee law, were
effectively failure-to-warn claims that could not survive
Mensing.304 The Strayhorn court also concluded that, just as in
Bartlett, the plaintiffs variously pleaded design-defect claims
contemplated a need for a strengthened warning by the generic
299. See infra text accompanying notes 30224; cases cited infra notes
30220.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Strayhorn v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 737 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2013).
303. Id. at 391.
304. Id. at 39395. As in Mensing, the drug at issue in Strayhorn was
metoclopramide, the generic equivalent of the brand-name drug known as
Reglan. Id. at 391. See also PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 257273
(2011). The plaintiffs in Strayhorn developed tardive dyskinesia, the same
disorder developed by the plaintiffs in Mensing. Strayhorn, 737 F.3d at 383;
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 257273. Most of the federal circuit courts decisions
applying Mensing and Bartlett have involved metoclopramide and plaintiffs
who developed tardive dyskenesia. See cases cited infra notes 31419. The
same is true of most of the state court decisions to be discussed later in the
article. See infra text accompanying notes 337484.
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manufacturers.305 Bartlett, therefore, mandated preemption of
those claims.306
No doubt concerned that their claims against the generic
manufacturers might not be permitted to go forward, the
plaintiffs in Strayhorn also sued the manufacturer of the
brand-name version of the drug on what amounted to failure-
to-warn grounds.307 They alleged that in deciding whether to
prescribe generic metoclopramide, physicians would
foreseeably rely on information provided by the brand-name
versions manufacturer.308 The Sixth Circuit rejected that
claim, however, because Tennessee product liability law would
not permit such a claim in the absence of a showing that the
plaintiffs ingested the brand-name version.309 The facts
revealed that they ingested only generics.310 Writing for the
Strayhorn panel, Judge Gillman observed that the court felt
compelled . . . [by the] controlling caselaw to rule as it did, but
that note should be taken of the basic unfairness of the cases
outcome.311 Judge Gillman went on to note that the plaintiffs
were caught in a classic Catch 22, barred from all claims
against the Generic Manufacturers whose drugs they ingested
(due to federal preemption) and from all claims against the
Brand-Name Manufacturer because they did not use the
brand-name version.312
305. Strayhorn, 737 F.3d at 39596 ([T]he plaintiffs do not allege that the
generic metoclopramide they took was ineffective . . . only that it was unsafe
when used long-term because of the drugs dangerous side effects . . . In order
to escape liability for such an alleged defect, the Generic Manufacturers would
have had to give a stronger warning than they were permitted to give under
federal law.).
306. Id. at 39697. The court did recognize that a failure-to-update
claima claim to be examined later in the articlecould survive preemption
under the right set of facts. Id. at 39597. In Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., the
Sixth Circuit had held that such a claim would not be preempted. Fulgenzi v.
PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578, 584 (6th Cir. 2013). In Strayhorn, however, the
court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to plead such a claim properly
and had waited until far too late in the proceedings to seek leave to amend
their complaints. See Strayhorn, 737 F.3d at 399400. For discussion of
Fulgenzi and failure-to-update claims, see infra text accompanying notes
36267 and infra note 369.
307. Strayhorn, 737 F.3d at 39495.
308. Id. at 404.
309. Id. at 401.
310. Id. at 40306.
311. Id. at 407.
312. Id. The Sixth Circuit noted the Mensing and Bartlett statements to
the effect that Congress has the power to resolve the dilemma faced by
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Another Sixth Circuit panel followed Strayhorns lead and
held that various tort claims against generic manufacturers
were preempted under Mensing and Bartlett.313 Similar
decisions interpreting Mensing and Bartlett as having a
sweeping preemptive effect on tort claims have come from the
Third,314 Fourth,315 Fifth,316 Eighth,317 Ninth,318 Tenth,319 and
Eleventh Circuits.320
plaintiffs such as those in Strayhorn. Id. The court added that the Tennessee
legislature might provide relief by changing the states product liability
statute to allow claims against brand-name manufacturers whose labels
control the warnings that the generic manufacturers are compelled by federal
law to duplicate. Id. But in the absence of such a change in controlling
principles, the plaintiffs would remain caught in [the] Catch 22. Id.
313. Germain v. Teva Pharms., USA, Inc., 756 F.3d 917, 93236 (6th Cir.
2014). As in Strayhorn, the Germain panel noted that a failure-to-update
claim might be actionable under the right set of facts. Id. at 93132. See also
supra note 304 and accompanying text. However, the court concluded that any
such claim had not properly been pleaded. Germain, 756 F.3d at 93132
(finding that Plaintiffs failed to plead facts creating a plausible inference that
the Generic Manufactures failed to implement the required black box
warning). For a discussion of failure-to-update claims, see infra text
accompanying notes 36369 and infra note 369. In addition, the court
discussed the Bartlett footnote hinting that parallel misbranding claims might
survive preemption. Germain, 756 F.3d at 92829; see Mut. Pharm. Co. v.
Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2477 n.4 (2013). However, the court concluded that
even if a parallel misbranding claim could survive preemption, the plaintiffs
had not properly pleaded such a claim. Germain, 756 F.3d at 92930.
314. In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 751 F.3d 150,
153, 15658, 16065 (3d Cir. 2014).
315. Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470, 47579 (4th Cir. 2014).
316. Johnson v. TEVA Pharms. USA, Inc., 758 F.3d 605, 609, 61014 (5th
Cir. 2014); Eckhardt v. Qualitest Pharm., Inc., 751 F.3d 674, 67880 (5th Cir.
2014); Lashley v. Pfizer, Inc., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 7126, at *816 (5th Cir.
Feb. 21, 2014); Morris v. PLIVA, Inc., 713 F.3d 774, 77678 (5th Cir. 2013).
317. Brinkley v. Pfizer, Inc., 772 F.3d 1133, 113941 (8th Cir. 2014);
Fullington v. Pfizer, Inc., 720 F.3d 739, 74446 (8th Cir. 2013); Bell v. Pfizer,
Inc., 716 F.3d 1087, 109495 (8th Cir. 2013) (post-Mensing but pre-Bartlett
decision holding that claims premised on failure to warn were preempted).
318. Moretti v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 12-16334, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11333, at
*46 (9th Cir. June 17, 2014).
319. Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 128690 (10th Cir. 2013).
Besides holding that the plaintiffs tort claims against the generic
manufacturer defendants were preempted, the Tenth Circuit rejected the
plaintiffs tort claims against a brand-name manufacturer defendant. See id.
at 128190. Because the plaintiffs had ingested generics rather than the
brand-name medication, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Oklahoma law
would not be likely to treat the brand-name manufacturer as owing legal
duties to the plaintiffs. Id. at 128186. Employing language similar to the
Sixth Circuits in Strayhorn, the court noted the catch-22 situation in which
the plaintiffs and other consumers of generic drugs find themselves: They
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In these decisions, the courts of appeal have devoted little
attention to the Supreme Courts previously noted hints that
there might be small openings in the Mensing-Bartlett
preemption barrier.321 Preemption has been held appropriate
cannot obtain relief from brand-name drug manufacturers because, as we
predict, [state law] would not impose a duty on the brand-name
manufacturers that flows to consumers of generic drugs. Yet the [plaintiffs]
claims against generic manufacturers are preempted under Mensing and
Bartlett. Id. at 1290. After noting that as a federal court, it had limited
authority to correct this potential injustice, the Tenth Circuit provided an
interesting suggestion about the role state courts might play: It is for the
state courts, rather than this panel, to engage in the delicate policy
considerations predicate to the expansion of the scope of state tort law. Id. As
later discussion and analysis will reveal, some state courts appear to have
picked up on this suggestion. See infra text accompanying notes 336603. The
Tenth Circuit also acknowledged the Supreme Courts unfortunate hand
remark in Mensing. Id. If consumers of generic drugs are to obtain federal
relief, the court concluded, it must come from Congress. Id. at 1290.
320. See Guarino v. Wyeth, LLC, 719 F.3d 1245, 124850 (11th Cir. 2013).
In Guarino, the Eleventh Circuit invoked Mensing, but not Bartlettan
understandable omission because Bartlett was decided only one day before
Guarino was released. See id. at 1245, 1247. In addition to the circuits
referred to in the text, the First Circuit has applied Mensing in holding that
tort claims against a drug manufacturer were preempted. See Marcus v.
Forest Laboratories, Inc., 779 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2015). The First Circuits
decision was unique, however, because the defendant was a brand-name
manufacturer and the plaintiffs had taken the brand-name medication. Id. at
3738. As explained in earlier discussion, the Supreme Court concluded in
Wyeth v. Levine that failure-to-warn claims against brand-name
manufacturers are not preempted on the ground of impossibility because such
manufacturers can rely on the CBE regulation as a basis for starting to use a
strengthened warning label without prior FDA approval. Wyeth v. Levine, 555
U.S. 555, 56970 (2009). See supra text accompanying notes 10916; supra
note 111 and accompanying text. However, the First Circuit concluded in
Marcus that Mensing was the relevant precedent even though it involved
claims against a generic manufacturer. Marcus, 779 F.3d at 4041. According
to the First Circuit, the CBE regulation was not an option for the brand-name
manufacturer under the particular facts in the case, because there was no
newly acquired [safety] information of the sort necessary to support a
revised label under the CBE. Id. at 4143. Rather, all of the potentially
relevant information bearing on the drugs safety presumably had been
evaluated by the FDA prior to the agencys approval of the drugs label. Id. at
4243. Therefore, the Marcus court reasoned, Mensings impossibility
rationale controlled because the defendant could not act independentlyi.e.,
on its ownto provide a strengthened label. Id. at 43. See also PLIVA, Inc. v.
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2581 (2011). Besides providing an interesting take
on Mensing, the First Circuits decision serves to illustrate not only Mensings
probable broadening of the impossibility doctrine but also that decisions
undermining of Levine. See supra text accompanying notes 16871, 24548.
321. See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574 n.1; Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133
S. Ct. 2466, 2477 n.4 (2013).
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regardless of whether the relevant facts occurred prior to or
after 2007.322 No circuit court addressed the Mensing footnote
in which the Court stated that because the cases facts arose
prior to 2007, it was not considering whether the 2007
statutory amendments might affect the analysis.323 As will be
seen, some state courts have ascribed significance to that
footnote.324
In a small number of cases, the federal courts of appeal
have picked up on the possibility, noted in a Bartlett footnote,
that state law-based claims paralleling the federal duty under
the misbranding statute might not be preempted.325 One Sixth
Circuit panel suggested that such parallel claims should escape
preemption.326 Another Sixth Circuit panel discussed the
possibility but ultimately took no position on the matter.327 In a
Fifth Circuit decision, the court spoke disapprovingly of
parallel claims and flatly rejected the notion that they should
escape Mensing-Bartlett preemption.328 As later discussion will
reveal, the parallel claims notion has taken hold in some of the
state court decisions.329
Two other features of the decisions of the federal courts of
appeal bear mentioning. First, several of them recognize that a
certain type of tort action known as a failure-to-update claim
322. See cases cited at supra notes 30220.
323. See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574 n.1. For explanation of the 2007
change in the law, see supra text accompanying notes 5557. The absence of
such discussion suggests either that the plaintiffs did not attempt to argue
that the 2007 amendments should make a difference in the analysis or that if
such an argument was made, the courts did not consider it substantial enough
to warrant discussion.
324. See infra text accompanying notes 37585, 43638, 56574.
325. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2477 n.4. The small number of decisions in
which the courts of appeal have discussed the Bartlett footnote about parallel
claims presumably means that plaintiffs in the federal court cases have
seldom attempted to make out such claims.
326. Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578, 58687 (6th Cir. 2013).
Fulgenzi actually preceded the Supreme Courts decision in Bartlett, but the
Sixth Circuits discussion of possible parallel claims anticipated what the
Court hinted at in the Bartlett footnote. See id.; Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2477
n.4.
327. Germain v. Teva Pharms., USA, Inc., 756 F.3d 917, 92830 (6th Cir.
2014). The court concluded that even if it were assumed that a parallel claim
would escape preemption, the plaintiffs had not properly pleaded such a claim.
Id. at 92930.
328. Lashley v. Pfizer, Inc., 750 F.3d 470, 476 (5th Cir. 2014).
329. See infra text accompanying notes 36062, 40811.
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should not be considered preempted under Mensing-Bartlett.330
Because this type of claim has become especially important in
the state court decisions issued in response to the relevant
Supreme Court decisions, discussion of the federal courts
treatment of failure-to-update claims will be reserved for a
later portion of the Article.331 Suffice it to say for now that even
though most of the federal courts of appeal that have
considered failure-to-update claims have said they are not
preempted, those courts generally have held that the claims
failed on other grounds.332
Second, various cases decided by the federal courts of
appeal have involved not only tort claims against generic
manufacturers, but also failure-to-warn claims against the
relevant brand-name manufacturers.333 In the previously
discussed Strayhorn decision, the Sixth Circuit held that tort
claims against a brand-name manufacturer could not be
pursued under the relevant states statutes or common law
where the plaintiffs ingested only the generic equivalent and
not the brand-name drug.334 On the same or similar grounds,
other circuits have unanimously rejected such claims in the
absence of a showing that the plaintiffs used the brand-name
medication.335 Some state courts, as will be seen, have been
more inclined to give traction to failure-to-warn claims against
330. See, e.g, Germain, 756 F.3d at 93132; Strayhorn v. Wyeth Pharms.,
Inc., 737 F.3d 378, 399 (6th Cir. 2013); Fulgenzi, 711 F.3d at 58189. Other
circuits have so concluded. See infra note 369.
331. See infra text accompanying notes 36369 and infra note 369.
332. E.g., Germain, 756 F.3d at 93132; Strayhorn, 737 F.3d at 399400.
Other circuits have ruled similarly. See infra note 369.
333. See Johnson v. TEVA Pharms. USA, Inc., 758 F.3d 605 (5th Cir. 2014);
Germain v. Teva Pharms., USA, Inc., 756 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2014); Moretti v.
Wyeth, Inc., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11333 (9th Cir., June 17, 2014); Eckhardt
v. Qualitest Pharms., Inc., 751 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 2014); Lashley, 750 F.3d at
476; Strayhorn v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., 737 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2013); Schrock
v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 2013); Fullington v. Pfizer, Inc., 720
F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 2013); Guarino v. Wyeth, LLC, 719 F.3d 1245, 1247 (11th
Cir. 2013); Bell v. Pfizer, Inc., 716 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 2013).
334. Strayhorn, 737 F.3d at 40306. The Sixth Circuit reached the same
conclusion in Germain. Germain, 756 F.3d at 93639.
335. Johnson, 758 F.3d at 61416; Moretti, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11333,
at *3*4; Eckhardt, 751 F.3d at 68082; Lashley, 750 F.3d at 476; Fullington,
720 F.3d at 74344; Schrock, 727 F.3d at 128186; Guarino, 719 F.3d at 1250
53; Bell, 716 F.3d at 109294. As the Sixth Circuit did in Strayhorn, the
Guarino court observed that either Congress or the relevant state legislature
could provide relief to harmed consumers by altering the controlling legal
rules. See Strayhorn, 737 F.3d at 407; see also Guarino, 719 F.3d at 1253.
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a brand-name manufacturer even though the plaintiff ingested
only the generic version of the drug.336
III. STATE COURT RESPONSES TO THE UNFORTUNATE
HAND
The Article now considers decisions issued by state courts
in the wake of Mensing and Bartlett. As this section reveals,
state courts have been more inclined than federal courts to
seek ways around Mensing-Bartlett preemption and thereby
preserve the prospect of tort remedies for harmed consumers.
State courts treatment of tort claims against generic
manufacturers will be discussed first, followed by examination
of state courts decisions dealing with claims against brand-
name manufacturers by plaintiffs who consumed generics.
A. FAILURE-TO-UPDATE AND PARALLEL CLAIMS AGAINST
GENERIC MANUFACTURERS: THEHUCK APPROACH
Huck v. Wyeth, Inc.337 provides a helpful starting point for
discussion. The 2014 decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa
illustrates a tendency of various state courts to scrutinize the
holdings and rationales in Mensing and Bartlett in order to
determine whether there may be a plausible basis on which
certain tort claims could escape preemption, as opposed to
assuming that the Supreme Courts decisions must be given a
vast sweep.338 Most notably, Huck illustrates state courts
receptivity to a type of claim known as a failure-to-update
claim and to the notion that state-law-based claims may assert
obligations paralleling those established in federal law.339
The plaintiff in Huck had taken metoclopramide, a generic
version of the brand-name drug Reglan, and had developed
tardive dyskinesia.340 These core facts were also present in
most of the previously discussed decisions by federal courts of
appeal and most of the state court decisions to be discussed
later.341 Although the lower courts in Huck had relied on
Mensing in granting the generic manufacturer summary
336. See infra text accompanying notes 457504.
337. Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 2014).
338. See infra text accompanying notes 354456.
339. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 36369.
340. Id. at 359.
341. See cases cited supra notes 30220. See also infra text accompanying
notes 370504 (discussing other state court decisions).
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judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs claims were
preempted, the Supreme Court of Iowa focused on Reglan-
related facts that distinguished the plaintiffs causes of action
from failure-to-warn claims falling squarely within Mensings
preemption rationale.342
When Hucks physician prescribed Reglan for her in 2004,
the physician relied on information in the Physicians Desk
Reference.343 This information included the Reglan labeling
that the FDA had approved 24 years earlier.344 As permitted by
state law, a pharmacist filled the prescription with the
defendants generic version of the drug.345 Approximately five
months after the plaintiff began using the medication, the FDA
approved a revised Reglan label that contained a stronger
warning about the tardive dyskinesia danger than the original
label had provided.346 Neither the brand-name manufacturer
nor the defendant generic manufacturer, PLIVA, Inc.,
communicated the revised labels information to Huck or her
physician.347 In addition, PLIVA did not employ the
strengthened label for its generic version of Reglan.348 Huck
continued to use PLIVAs generic for approximately two years
and was then diagnosed with tardive dyskinesia.349
Emphasizing PLIVAs failure to use the strengthened label
approved by the FDA, the Supreme Court of Iowa observed that
the cases facts present a narrow path around Mensing
preemption.350 The court concluded that Hucks negligence,
misrepresentation, fraud, and breach of implied warranty
claims could credibly be characterized as failure-to-update
claims that would not be subject to impossibility preemption
under Mensing.351 In Mensing, of course, the Court emphasized
that under the duty of sameness established by federal law,
generic makers were obligated to use the same label approved
342. Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 359, 36269.
343. Id. at 359.
344. Id. at 358.
345. Id. at 359.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 364.
351. Id. at 36267. The court pointed out that there were no failure-to-
update allegations in Mensing. Hence, the Supreme Court did not rule on any
such claim. Id. at 362.
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by the FDA for the brand-name drug.352 The Court reasoned
there that impossibility preemption applied because the
defendant could not simultaneously satisfy its federal duty to
use the approved label and fulfill what the plaintiffs state-law-
based claims contemplated: the use of a label with stronger
warnings.353
But Huck was different, Iowas highest court maintained.
Whereas the generic manufacturers federal duty of sameness
pointed in favor of preemption on impossibility grounds in
Mensing, that duty cut the other way in Huck. Once the FDA
approved a strengthened label for Reglan, PLIVA became
obligated to use that strengthened label.354 This federal
obligation to use the strengthened label was consistent with
what Hucks state-law-based claims contemplated: the use of a
stronger warning. Hence, the federal and state obligations in
Huck were not impossible to fulfill simultaneously and were
not otherwise in conflict.355
Importantly, too, PLIVA could have sought to satisfy its
federal duty to use the revised label through the previously
discussed CBE regulation.356 The FDAs position has been that
the CBE route to using a revised label without prior approval
from the FDA is normally available only to brand-name
manufacturers and not to generic manufacturers.357 However,
the FDA has concluded that generic manufacturers may rely on
the CBE regulation in an exceptional situation of direct
relevance to the case: when they begin using a revised label
because that revised label is the one approved by the FDA for
the brand-name drug.358 The court thus determined that even
352. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 257475 (2011).
353. Id. at 2575, 258081.
354. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 364.
355. Id. at 36466. Neither was preemption warranted on purposes-and-
objectives grounds. The court noted that Congress did not include an express
preemption provision in the federal drug regulations laws and that the
Supreme Court has commented favorably on the complementary role that
state-law-based tort claims may play alongside FDA regulation. Id. at 36667.
See also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574, 579 (2009). Hence, the Huck
court concluded that allowing claims such as those brought by the plaintiff
would not undermine federal objectives. Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 36667.
356. Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 364. For discussion of the CBE regulation, see
supra text accompanying notes 4547.
357. See supra note 47.
358. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2575 (2011); see also
Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 364.
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though the impossibility rationale led the Supreme Court to a
preemption finding in Mensing, that same rationale logically
led to a rejection of preemption in Huck.359
The Huck court also stressed that the plaintiffs failure-to-
update claims were not an effort to enforce a purely federal
obligation. Had they been such an effort, the court reasoned,
the claims would be problematic because the federal drug
regulation laws do not authorize a federal right of action in
favor of private plaintiffs.360 The plaintiff in Huck, however,
acted permissibly by seeking to enforce duties and obligations
set under state tort and warranty law. Those duties, the court
emphasized, are independent ofand parallel toduties under
federal law.361 In this sense, the court appeared to pick up on
Justice Alitos Bartlett footnote, in which he hinted that state-
law-based claims might survive Mensing-Bartlett preemption if
the duties contemplated are parallel to federal duties.362
In holding that the plaintiff should be able to go forward
with her failure-to-update claims, the Huck court relied on
Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., a United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit decision.363 Like Huck, Fulgenzi was a case in
which the plaintiff used a generic version of Reglan, developed
tardive dyskinesia, and based her lawsuit on the generic
manufacturers failure to use the strengthened label after the
FDA approved it for the drug.364 Fulgenzis explanation of why
Mensings impossibility preemption rationale did not apply to a
failure-to-update claim proved influential not only to the court
359. Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 36466.
360. Id. at 36769.
361. Id. at 36869. Accordingly, the case was not like Buckman Co. v.
Plaintiffs Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001). In that case, the Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff could not proceed with a claim that the defendant
committed fraud upon the FDA during the regulatory process, because the
matter of defrauding the FDA when seeking regulatory approval was
specifically and exclusively addressed in federal law. The plaintiffs claim,
therefore, invoked only federal law, as opposed to a preexisting state-law-
based obligation. See id. at 34753; see also Sharkey, supra note 296, at 369
71 (noting that Buckman should be interpreted narrowly, in light of its fraud-
on-the-agency facts and claim).
362. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2577 n.4. (2013);
Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 36869.
363. Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2013). See Huck, 850
N.W.2d at 357, 363 n.7, 364, 36769.
364. Fulgenzi, 711 F.3d at 580.
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in Huck, but also to other state courts.365 The same was true of
Fulgenzis rejection of the argument that preemption was
warranted on purposes-and-objectives grounds.366
The Huck court followed Fulgenzis lead in another sense,
by spurning the generic manufacturers argument that the
failure-to-update claim, even if not preempted, should fail
because the plaintiff had separately contended that the
strengthened label approved by the FDA still would not have
provided a fully adequate warning.367 In rejecting that
argument, the courts in Huck and Fulgenzi declined to deprive
the plaintiffs of the opportunity to prove a sufficient causation
link between the allegedly inadequate warning used by the
defendants and the harm the plaintiffs experienced.368 Both
courts indicated that the plaintiffs should get a chance to
establish that a moderately stronger warning, even if less than
optimal, could have prevented the harm that the defendants
inadequate warning failed to prevent.369
365. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 36769. For examples of how the decision
has influenced state courts, see infra text accompanying notes 40023. For
discussion of Fulgenzi and failure-to-update claims, see Sharkey, supra note
296, at 36667.
366. See infra text accompanying note 423.
367. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 36364 n.7 (citing Fulgenzi, 711 F.3d at 587
88).
368. See id.
369. See id. Although it was not the only federal court of appeals decision
recognizing that failure-to-update claims are not preempted by federal drug
regulation law, Fulgenzi stands out for taking a softer line on whether such
claims should survive a dismissal motion premised on other grounds.
Fulgenzi, 711 F.3d at 58788. In other decisions in which courts of appeal
concluded that failure-to-update claims escaped preemption, the courts
nevertheless agreed with the defendants that dismissal of the claims was
warranted for reasons similar to the argument rejected in Fulgenzi or for
other reasons. See Brinkley v. Pfizer, Inc., 772 F.3d 1133, 113739 (8th Cir.
2014) (failure-to-update claim not preempted, but claim rejected on basis of
learned intermediary doctrine because prescribing physician had received
strengthened labels information from brand-name manufacturer, causing
causal link to be broken); Germain v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. 756 F.3d 917,
93132 (6th Cir. 2014) (failure-to-update claim not preempted, but claim
rejected as improperly pleaded); Eckhardt v. Qualitest Pharm., Inc., 751 F.3d
674, 67980 (5th Cir. 2014) (failure-to-update claim not preempted, but claim
rejected as inadequately pleaded); Moretti v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 12-16334, 2014
U.S. App. LEXIS 11333, at *6 (9th Cir. June 17, 2014) (failure-to-update claim
presumably not preempted, but claim rejected because plaintiff was no longer
using medication when FDA required stronger warning); Strayhorn v. Wyeth
Pharm., Inc., 737 F.3d 378, 399400 (6th Cir. 2013) (failure-to-update claim
presumably not preempted, but claim rejected as inadequately pleaded
because of lack of facts showing plaintiff was using medication at relevant
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B. NARROWLY INTERPRETINGMENSING AND BARTLETT: THE
HASSETT APPROACH
The same drug at issue in Huck and many of the other
previously discussed casesmetoclopramide, the generic form
of the brand-name drug Reglanhas been the subject of mass
tort litigation in Pennsylvania courts. In Hassett v. Defoe,370
one of two closely related appeals decided by the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania,371 two generic manufacturers appealed
from the lower courts overruling of their demurrer to the
master complaint filed by the named plaintiff, who was among
the more than two thousand consumers claiming to have been
harmed after they used the defendants metoclopramide.372 The
plaintiff pleaded various claims, including negligence, strict
liability, misrepresentation, fraud, and breach of express and
implied warranties.373 The defendants argued that the lower
court should have dismissed the complaint because, in their
view, Mensing and Bartlett preempted all of the plaintiffs
claims.374
Early in its opinion, the Hassett court signaled that it
would not be issuing a sweeping ruling of the sort the
defendant wanted.375 The court emphasized that the only
preempted claims would be failure-to-warn claims based on the
content of generic labels that were consistent with the FDA-
time); Fullington v. Pfizer, Inc., 720 F.3d 739, 747 (8th Cir. 2013) (same); Bell
v. Pfizer, Inc., 716 F.3d 1087, 109798 (8th Cir. 2013) (same). But see Johnson
v. TEVA Pharms., USA, Inc., 758 F.3d 605, 61112 (5th Cir. 2014) (suggesting
that failure-to-update claim would be preempted and, alternatively, rejecting
claim as improperly pleaded attempt to enforce an exclusively federal
obligation); Lashley v. Pfizer, Inc., 750 F.3d 470, 47476 (5th Cir. 2014)
(failure-to-update claim preempted; alternatively, claim rejected as logically
incoherent, given plaintiffs allegations to effect that no approved labels
during relevant time period provided adequate warning) (citing Morris v.
PLIVA, Inc., 713 F.3d 774, 77778 (5th Cir. 2013)); Guarino v. Wyeth, LLC,
719 F.3d 1245, 124850 (11th Cir. 2013) (suggesting that failure-to-update
claim would be preempted and, alternatively, rejecting claim as improperly
pleaded and as barred by learned intermediary doctrine).
370. Hassett v. Defoe, 74 A.3d 202 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
371. The Superior Court decided a companion case, In re
Reglan/Metoclopramide Litig., 81 A.3d 80 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013), the same day
as Hassett and used the same opinion text used in Hassett. Therefore, further
discussion and citations will refer only to Hassett rather than to both of the
decisions.
372. Hassett, 74 A.3d at 20506.
373. Id. at 202.
374. Id. at 20506.
375. See id. at 206.
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approved brand-name labeland even then, only if those
claims arose prior to the 2007 amendments to the federal drug
regulation laws.376 Such claims would be barred under the
impossibility rationale outlined inMensing.377
Reading Mensing narrowly, the Hassett court picked up on
the footnote in which Justice Thomas, writing for the Mensing
majority, stated that the Court was deciding the case in light of
pre-2007 law and without regard for the 2007 amendments
because the key facts in the case took place prior to 2007.378
Although the Mensing footnote did not take a position on
whether the 2007 amendments might have made a difference,
the Hassett court took the footnote as an invitation to think
about whether the amendments could affect the analysis of
claims whose underlying facts occurred after the 2007
enactment.379 The amendments arguably confirmed an
obligation on the part of generic manufacturers to ask the FDA
to strengthen an approved label if later-acquired safety
information suggested a need for the label revision, and gave
the FDA the authority to require use of a particular revised
label (as opposed to the pre-2007 rule that only empowered the
FDA to seek the brand-name manufacturers agreement on the
content of a revised label).380
The court concluded in Hassett that the 2007 amendments
could indeed make a difference in the analysis of failure-to-
warn cases arising after 2007 because, in its view, the
impossibility rationale outlined in Mensing could be weakened
to the point of not being controlling in that context.381 In
Mensing, the Court stated that even if it were assumed that
generic manufacturers are obligated to ask the FDA for
approval of a revised label in the event that it acquired
important safety-related information, the legal reality that the
FDA could then only negotiate with the brand-name
manufacturer about a potential revised label meant that, at
most, there was only a possibility that a strengthened label
would result.382 That possible, but hardly definite, outcome,
Justice Thomas explained, was not enough to alter the
376. Id.
377. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 258082 (2011).
378. See id. at 2574 n.1.
379. See Hassett, 74 F.3d at 20607, 217.
380. Id. at 217 n.13. See also supra text accompanying notes 5557.
381. See Hassett, 74 F.3d at 217 n.13.
382. See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 257880.
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conclusion that under existing law, it was impossible for the
generic manufacturer to comply with its federal duty of
sameness regarding the label and with what state-law-based
failure-to-warn claims contemplated.383 According to the
Hassett court, however, the 2007 amendments elimination of
the need for the FDA to negotiate with the brand-name
manufacturer caused the road to a strengthened label to be less
attenuated and therefore promising enough to make the
impossibility argument ill-fitting.384 The court concluded,
therefore, that in the absence of court decisions clearly
addressing the effect of the 2007 amendments on preemption
analysis, it would be premature to dismiss post-2007 failure-
to-warn claims.385
As noted earlier, Hassetts narrow interpretation of
Mensing acknowledged that failure-to-warn claims would be
preempted if they arose prior to 2007 and were based on
generic labels consistency with the FDA-approved labels for
the relevant brand-name medications.386 A failure-to-update
claim of the sort present in previously discussed cases,
however, would escape preemption because it would be based
on generic labels lack of consistency with the relevant FDA-
approved labels.387 The plaintiff in Hassett brought such a
claim, alleging that the defendants had failed to adopt the
strengthened Reglan label approved by the FDA in 2004.388 As
the Supreme Court of Iowa had concluded in Huck v. Wyeth,
Inc.,389 the Hassett court held that the failure-to-update claim
was not preempted and could therefore go forward.390
383. See id., at 257781.
384. See Hassett, 74 F.3d at 21617 & n.13.
385. Id. at 217.
386. See supra text accompanying notes 37577.
387. See Hassett, 74 F.3d at 206, 216. For earlier discussion of failure-to-
update claims, see supra text accompanying notes 35469.
388. See Hassett, 74 F.3d at 216.
389. Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W. 2d 353 (Iowa 2014). For discussion of
the failure-to-update claim in Huck, see supra text accompanying notes 354
69.
390. See Hassett, 74 F.3d at 216. Alternatively, the court concluded that
the failure-to-update allegations could be considered as a negligence per se
claim, on the theory that the violation of the federal statutory duty of
sameness regarding the approved drug label could serve to satisfy the duty
and breach elements of negligence per se. Id.
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Keeping in mind the presumption against preemption,391
the Hassett court turned to consideration of the plaintiffs other
claims and to whether they would be preempted under Mensing
and Bartlett.392 The court declined to ascribe much significance
to the federal court decisions giving Mensing and Bartlett
sweeping effect.393 The federal court decisions were not binding
and, in the Hassett majoritys view, did not always reflect
careful analysis of what the different states common law
claims contemplated.394 The court concluded that the plaintiffs
negligence and strict liability claims of the design-defect
variety did not, under Pennsylvania common law, contemplate
a need to change the drugs design or labeling.395 Rather, the
court maintained, they sought the imposition of liability
because the defendants allegedly sold a defective and perhaps
unreasonably dangerous product.396 Therefore, the court
suggested, the plaintiffs Pennsylvania-law-based claims did
not call for what the Supreme Court, in Bartlett, construed
another states common-law defective-design claims as
contemplating.397 According to the Hassett majority, this also
meant that Bartletts rationale did not dictate preemption of
the plaintiffs claims under Pennsylvania common law.398
The Hassett majoritys narrow interpretations of Mensing
and Bartlett contrasted sharply with the tendencies displayed
by the federal courts of appeal in applying those decisions.399
As earlier discussion revealed, the circuit courts have read
391. See id. at 210.
392. Id. at 211.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 21112; see id. at 214.
395. Id. at 212.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. See id. at 21215. Through similar reasoning, the court concluded in
Hassett that the plaintiffs breach of express and implied warranty claims, as
well as his misrepresentation and fraud claims, escaped preemption under
Mensing because those claims were not premised on a supposed deficiency in
the products label. Id. at 21415. Instead, they were based on the products
failure to live up to how it was represented on the label or in advertisements.
Id.
399. The majority opinion prompted a sharp dissent premised on the
notion that the court had unduly restricted the effect of Mensing and Bartlett.
See id. at 21721 (Platt, Senior J., concurring and dissenting).
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Mensing and Bartlett as contemplating broad-ranging
preemptive effect.400
C. OTHER STATE COURT DECISIONS IN CASES AGAINST GENERIC
MANUFACTURERS
The Court of Appeals of Missouri decided two similar cases
in which plaintiffs who took generic metoclopramide and
developed tardive dyskinesia sued the relevant generic
manufacturers. In Franzman v. Wyeth, Inc.401 and Nicely v.
Wyeth, Inc.,402 the respective plaintiffs pleaded various state-
law-based claims, including negligent failure to warn, strict
liability, misrepresentation, fraud, and breach of warranty. In
each case, the lower court had dismissed all of the plaintiffs
claims on the ground of preemption.403 Because the two cases
presented the same key issues and were decided the same day,
the appellate court provided a full explanation of its reasoning
in Franzman and then, in Nicely, expressly adopted that
reasoning.404
In Franzman, the court reviewed Mensing and Bartlett and
construed the plaintiffs variously denominated claims as
effectively failure-to-warn claims.405 As such, the court
concluded, nearly all of those claims were preempted under the
impossibility rationale laid out in the Supreme Courts
decisions.406 One claim, however, would escape preemption: the
plaintiffs failure-to-update claim, which was based on the
generic manufacturers failure to adopt the strengthened
Reglan warning label approved by the FDA in 2004.407
The Franzman court reasoned that the impossibility
rationale of Mensing and Bartlett did not apply to the failure-
400. See supra text accompanying notes 299332. Later, the Article will
analyze and assess Hassett. See infra text accompanying notes 56577.
401. Franzman v. Wyeth, Inc., 451 S.W.3d 676 (Mo. App. 2014).
402. Nicely v. Wyeth, Inc., 451 S.W.3d 694 (Mo. App. 2014).
403. Franzman, 451 S.W.3d at 67879, 68283, 686; Nicely, 451 S.W.3d at
69596. Although the cases were filed in a Missouri court, Kentucky law
applied to each case. Franzman, 451 S.W.3d at 678; Nicely, 451 S.W.3d at 696
n.6.
404. Franzman, 451 S.W.3d at 67994; Nicely, 451 S.W.3d at 69697.
405. Franzman, 451 S.W.3d at 68587.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 68789. In support of its holding on the failure-to-update claim,
the court cited two decisions discussed earlier in the article: Huck v. Wyeth,
Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 2014); and Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578
(6th Cir. 2013). See supra text accompanying notes 33769.
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to-update claim and that the generic manufacturers federal
duty of sameness regarding labeling required them to use the
revised label.408 Moreover, the court observed, the duty to
provide the stronger warning in the revised label was not
purely a matter of federal law.409 The notion of providing a
stronger warning was an independent duty that stemmed from
state law and was contemplated by the plaintiffs state-law-
based claims.410 Hence, for purposes of the failure-to-update
claim, the generic manufacturers federal and state-law
obligations were consistent rather than being in conflict.411 The
reasoning articulated in Franzman led to the same result in
Nicely, as the court there held that the plaintiffs failure-to-
update claim escaped preemption but that her other failure-to-
warn claims did not.412
408. Franzman, 451 S.W.3d at 68788.
409. Id. at 68889.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 689. In a case presenting facts similar to those in Franzman, the
Georgia Court of Appeals relied on Franzmans reasoning in holding that a
failure-to-update claim and other failure-to-warn claims under state law
survived preemption. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Dement, 335 Ga. App. 398, 780
S.E.2d 735, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 772, at *23, *59, *910 n.17 (Ga. Ct. App.,
Nov. 20, 2015). Once the brand-name maker of Reglan began using a
strengthened label and the defendant manufacturer of the generic version did
not employ the strengthened label, the defendant allegedly violated not only a
federal duty but also a parallel state duty to provide a meaningful warning.
Id. at *59. The federal and state duties thus were consistent rather than
impossible to fulfill simultaneously. Id. at *79.
412. Nicely v. Wyeth, Inc., 451 S.W.3d 694, 697 (Mo. App. 2014). In another
case dealing with metoclopramide, a Florida trial court used reasoning similar
to that employed in Franzman and Nicely in holding that the plaintiffs
failure-to-update claim escaped Mensing preemption and that the defendant,
accordingly, was not entitled to judgment on the pleadings. Swaw v. Wyeth
LLC, No.16-2011-CA-002492, 2013 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 150, at *15 (July 22,
2013). However, a later decision of a Florida appellate court in a different case
leaves uncertainty about the status of failure-to-update claims under Florida
law. See Dietrich v. Actavis, 138 So. 3d 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). In a
cryptic per curiam opinion that was one paragraph in length, the Court of
Appeal of Florida gave sweeping preemptive effect to Mensing and may have
suggested that even a failure-to-update claim would not survive. Id. The
Swaw court also held that a strict liability design-defect claim was not
preempted under Mensing and so could go forward. Swaw, 2013 Fla. Cir.
LEXIS 150, at *56. However, the court did not appear to have considered
Bartlett, which the Supreme Court had decided a month earlier. See id. The
ruling on the design-defect claim may therefore be open to question. The court
suggested, however, that the defendants failure to employ the strengthened
label approved by the FDA was a factor bearing upon whether strict liability
should apply. Id. at *45. That factor might arguably make Bartletts
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Similar reasoning led the Court of Appeal of California to
hold, in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Superior Court,413
that the plaintiffs failure-to-update claim was not preempted
and that the lower court had not erred in overruling the
defendants demurrer.414 As in other cases already discussed,
the plaintiff contended that even though the FDA had approved
a revised label for the relevant brand-name drug, the generic
manufacturers whose version she used had failed to employ the
revised label.415 Accordingly, the plaintiff did not receive the
stronger warning that the revised label furnished regarding the
type of harm she later experienced as a result of using the
medication.416
The California court concluded that Mensings
impossibility rationale, which would mandate preemption of
failure-to-warn claims to the extent that they called for use of a
stronger warning than provided for in the relevant FDA-
approved label, would not apply to the failure-to-update
claim.417 It was not impossible for the generic manufacturers to
employ the revised label; indeed, they were required to use it
after it received FDA approval.418 Moreover, the Teva court
reasoned, state law contemplated a duty to use adequate
warningsa duty parallel to the federal obligation to use the
revised label.419 The plaintiff, therefore, was not seeking to
enforce a purely federal duty, and the generic manufacturers
could simultaneously have satisfied both their federal
obligation and their state law-based duties.420
impossibility reasoning less applicable. See supra text accompanying notes
18597.
413. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Super. Ct, 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 150 (Ct. App.
2013).
414. Id. at 15253, 15659.
415. Id. at 15253.
416. Id. at 153, 15657. For discussion of other cases in which the plaintiff
made a similar claim, see supra text accompanying notes 337412. This time,
however, the drug was something other than metoclopramide. The plaintiff in
Teva had used generic versions of the brand-name drug Fosamax. Teva
Pharms. USA, Inc., 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 153.
417. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 15253, 15658.
418. See id. at 15758.
419. See id. at 158.
420. See id. In so concluding, the court relied heavily on Fulgenzi v.
PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2013). See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 158
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 15758. For discussion of Fulgenzi, see supra text
accompanying notes 36369. See also PLIVA, Inc. v. Dement, 335 Ga. App.
398, 780 S.E.2d 735, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 772, at *511 (Ga. Ct. App., Nov.
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In Teva, the court noted other cases in which courts had
concluded that failure-to-update claims escaped preemption.421
The California court, however, declined to do what various
federal courts had done when they held that such a claim was
not preempted but rejected it for reasons such as inadequate
pleading or supposed inconsistency with other contentions
raised by the plaintiff.422 The court observed that differences
between federal and state pleading standards could account for
some of those decisions and suggested that given the
preliminary posture of the case, the plaintiff should get a
chance to prove in later proceedings that the use of the revised
warning would have caused her to stop using the medication.423
That chance should be afforded, the court noted, even if the
plaintiff contended elsewhere in her complaint that the
warning in the revised label, though strengthened, did not go
as far as an optimal warning would have gone.424
Guvenoz v. Target Corp.,425 one of the most recent state
court cases against generic manufacturers, merits attention
because of its factual configuration and the courts careful
analysis. The plaintiffs decedent (her husband) had been
prescribed Darvocet but received a generic version when the
prescription was filled.426 In various claims against the
manufacturer of the generic her husband had used, the
plaintiff contended that the medication caused him to
experience a cardiac arrest and brain injuries that led to his
death.427 Guvenoz also presented an important factual wrinkle
not present in the previously discussed cases: an eventual FDA
order banning the sale of the medication at issue.428
Approximately six months after the cardiac arrest the
plaintiffs decedent experienced, the FDA ordered that
Darvocet and generic versions of it be withdrawn from the
20, 2015) (employing similar reasoning regarding failure-to-update claim and
other state-law-based claims that paralleled federal duties).
421. See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 15761.
422. See id. at 160. For discussion of those federal court decisions, see
supra note 369.
423. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 160.
424. Id. The court observed that the plaintiff was entitled to plead
inconsistent facts. Id.
425. Guvenoz v. Target Corp., 30 N.E.3d 404 (Ill. App. 2015).
426. Id. at 409.
427. Id. at 40809, 41112.
428. Id. at 410.
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market.429 The plaintiffs claims included negligence and strict
liability claims dealing with the design, production, and
distribution of the medication, as well as misrepresentation
and fraud claims dealing with statements about the drugs
safety.430 The generic manufacturer moved for dismissal,
arguing that Mensing and Bartlett called for preemption of all
of the claims.431
Utilizing a procedure allowed under Illinois law, the trial
court sent the Appellate Court of Illinois certified questions
that asked whether the plaintiffs claims were preempted.432
The appellate court appeared to set the tone early in its
Guvenoz opinion with this statement:
Defendants ask us to adopt a position, whereby consumers of generic
drugs cannot sue the brand-name manufacturer because they did
not ingest the brand-name drug, but they are also barred from suing
the generic manufacturer because, since federal law requires the
generic manufacturer to be in lock-step with the brand-name
manufacturer, federal law then preempts their claims, thereby
leaving generic consumers without any recovery. In essence, what
defendants are arguing on this appeal and at this early pleading
stage of the litigation is that they should be able to market a drug,
even assuming that they know that it is dangerous and useless, until
the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) officially stops them, and
then bear no financial responsibility for the consequences.433
The court then launched an analysis leading to the
conclusion that all of the plaintiffs claims escaped
preemption.434
In Guvenoz, the court examined the impossibility rationale
set forth in Mensing and Bartlett and noted that the facts in
the two Supreme Court cases had occurred prior to a 2007
change in federal law.435 The facts in Guvenoz, however,
occurred after 2007.436 Although it stated that it was not taking
a firm position on the effect of the 2007 amendments,437 the
Guvenoz court suggested that
429. Id. at 41011.
430. Id. at 40910.
431. See id. at 411.
432. Id. at 409, 412.
433. Id. at 409 (internal citation omitted).
434. See id. at 41326.
435. Id. at 413.
436. Id. at 413, 416.
437. Id. at 413, 417. The court also characterized Mensing as having
expressed no view as to whether its holding applied to post-2007 cases like
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[b]y removing at least some of the discretion afforded the [brand-
name] manufacturer that made it impossible for generic
manufacturers to comply with both federal and state law, the
amendment[s] arguably change[] the landscape for generic
manufacturers and may make their situation closer to the brand-
name manufacturer held liable in Wyeth v. Levine.438
Bartletts impossibility rationale, the Guvenoz court
explained, rested on the notion that the plaintiffs tort claims
called for the generic manufacturer to do things that federal
law prohibited it from doing: changing the FDA-approved
design of the drug and using a product label other than the
FDA-approved one.439 But that rationale should not apply,
according to the Illinois court, when no remedial measure could
have made enough of a safety difference anyway, as evidenced
by the fact that the FDA ultimately ordered the unreasonably
dangerous drug withdrawn from the market instead of
directing that a stronger warning be used.440 The Guvenoz
court noted Bartletts statement that an actor seeking to
satisfy both his federal- and state-law obligations is not
required to cease acting altogether in order to avoid
liability.441 However, the Illinois court observed that the
statement in which the Supreme Court rejected the so-called
stop-selling argument was made in the context of the Bartlett
case, where the drug was safe and effective for the vast
majority of the people taking it, and ceasing to act would have
benefitted only [the] very small number of people who suffered
an adverse reaction.442 The Guvenoz context was different, the
court observed, because the FDA concluded that the public at
the one here. Id. at 416. See also PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567,
2574 n.1 (2011).
438. Guvenoz, 30 N.E.3d at 417. Recall that in Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S.
555 (2009), the Supreme Court rejected the brand-name manufacturers
impossibility argument. Id. at 568, 57073. For discussion of Levine, see supra
text accompanying notes 68127. The Guvenoz court also noted Levines
invocation of the presumption against preemption, its emphasis on the
demanding nature of the preemption defense, and its indications that
Congress, in not creating a private right of action in the federal drug
regulation laws, contemplated a role for state-law-based causes of action in
providing remedies to harmed consumers. Guvenoz, 30 N.E.3d at 41415.
Moreover, the Guvenoz court observed, Congress did not include an express
preemption provision in the drug regulation statutes. Id. at 417.
439. Guvenoz, 30 N.E.3d at 418. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct.
2466, 2473 (2013).
440. Guvenoz, 30 N.E.3d at 41819.
441. Id. at 418 (quoting Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2477).
442. Id. (alteration in original).
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large would not benefit from [the] drug [at issue] and ordered it
withdrawn from the market.443
The court elaborated on the differences between Guvenoz
and the Supreme Courts decisions:
In the case at bar, plaintiff alleged that the drug was simply unsafe
and should not have been sold at all, and there was no warning that
could have cured the problem. By contrast, in both Bartlett and
Mensing, the problem was addressed by the FDA with an improved
warning.444
The court concluded, accordingly, that the logic of Bartlett
and Mensing does not apply to plaintiffs claims, and their
holdings do not preempt the state-law claims in this
case.445
Rejecting the defendants argument that preemption under
Mensing and Bartlett was necessary because the plaintiffs
claims contemplated actions the defendant was barred from
taking by federal law,446 the Guvenoz court commented more
specifically on why the particular claims brought by the
plaintiff should not be preempted. The court noted that the
plaintiffs negligence claims did not call for the defendant to
change the design of the drug or the warnings accompanying
it.447 Rather, the court observed, the negligence claims focused
on a supposed failure to use reasonable care in the sense that
the generic manufacturer knew or should have known of the
risk posed by the drug at the time of its manufacture.448 With
its focus on whether the product was unreasonably dangerous,
the plaintiffs strict liability claim created no direct and
positive conflict with [the generic manufacturers] duty of
sameness, when the drug should not have been sold.449
The Guvenoz court also explained that the
misrepresentation and fraud claims did not amount to calls for
the defendant to alter the product label.450 Instead, those
claims rested on the premise that there was no way to market
this drug, which was effectively useless and full of
unreasonable risk, without fraudulently misrepresenting its
443. Id.
444. Id. at 419.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 422.
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 423.
450. Id. at 424.
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qualities451 and on the related premise that there were no
warnings which would have magically transformed [the drug
into one] that was safe and effective.452 With none of the
plaintiffs claims being preempted, the appellate court
remanded the case for further proceedings.453
Of course, plaintiffs in cases against generic manufacturers
typically have not fared as well on the preemption question as
the plaintiff did in Guvenoz.454 In response to the unfortunate
hand they have been dealt with regard to claims against
generic manufacturers,455 harmed consumers have sometimes
sued the relevant brand-name manufacturer even though they
ingested only a generic version. Earlier discussion in the
Article revealed that various federal courts have dismissed
claims against brand-name manufacturers under such
circumstances.456 The following subsection examines state
courts treatment of such claims.
D. STATE COURT DECISIONS IN CASES AGAINST BRAND-NAME
MANUFACTURERS
In four post-Mensing and post-Bartlett cases decided by
state appellate courts, plaintiffs who experienced harm after
taking a generic drug have attempted to sue the brand-name
manufacturer. Only once has the plaintiffs claim survived the
defendants dismissal or summary judgment motion, though
dissenting judges in one of the other three cases took the
position that a claim along those lines should be recognized.457
Earlier discussion focused on the Supreme Court of Iowas
treatment, in Huck v. Wyeth, Inc.,458 of claims against a generic
manufacturer.459 The plaintiff in Huck also sued the relevant
brand-name manufacturer on various grounds, including
negligence and misrepresentation grounds.460 The claims
against the brand-name manufacturer revolved around the
451. Id.
452. Id. at 425.
453. Id. at 426.
454. See supra text accompanying notes 299324.
455. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2581 (2011).
456. See supra text accompanying notes 30810, 33335.
457. See infra text accompanying notes 460504.
458. Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 2014).
459. The earlier discussion of Huck appears at supra text accompanying
notes 33769.
460. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 360.
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notions that the approved label for the drug did not emphasize
safety concerns to the extent it should have, that the brand-
name manufacturer should have proposed a strengthened label
or should have begun to use one under the previously discussed
CBE regulation, and that because generic makers must use the
same label used for the brand-name version, consumers of
generics foreseeably would be harmed in the absence of a
strengthened label.461
The Supreme Court of Iowa held in Huck that the brand-
name maker was entitled to summary judgment.462 Although
all seven members of the court had subscribed to the portion of
Justice Watermans opinion dealing with the plaintiffs claims
against the generic manufacturer,463 the portion of the opinion
dealing with the claims against the brand-name manufacturer
proved to be a plurality analysis because only three justices
agreed to it.464 The courts chief justice merely concurred in the
result on the brand-name manufacturer aspect of the case, and
three other members of the court dissented.465
The fact that the plaintiff did not use the brand-name drug
proved fatal to her claims, according to the plurality, given a
well-settled requirement of Iowa law[that] the plaintiff must
prove injury caused by a product sold or supplied by the
defendant.466 This requirement applied, Justice Waterman
explained, regardless of how the plaintiff denominated her
claims.467 The plurality also declined the invitation to change
Iowa law to impose a new duty on manufacturers to those who
never used their products and were instead harmed by use of a
competitors product.468 In ruling that the brand-name
manufacturer did not owe the plaintiff a duty and that the
requisite causation link was also lacking, the plurality said the
court would be joining the overwhelming majority of courts
461. See id. at 36974.
462. See id. at 356, 381.
463. See id. at 381.
464. See id. at 382 (Hecht, J., joined by Wiggins and Appel, JJ., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (I respectfully dissent from the majoritys
analysis and disposition of the claims against the brand defendants.).
465. See id. at 381 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially); id. at 382 (Hecht, J.,
joined by Wiggins and Appel, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
466. Id. at 369.
467. See id. at 371 ([T]he product-identification causation requirement
applied regardless of the theory which liability is predicated upon.).
468. Id. at 369.
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that had ruled similarly regarding claims against brand-name
makers when the plaintiff had used only a generic.469
Speaking from a policy perspective, the Huck plurality
observed that it was unwilling to make brand name
manufacturers the de facto insurers for competing generic
manufacturers470 and added that [t]he unfairness resulting
from Mensing is best addressed by Congress or the FDA.471
Although Chief Justice Cady provided the necessary vote for
the outcome on the brand-name manufacturer aspect of the
case, he concurred in the result rather than subscribing to the
pluralitys reasoning.472 I agree with much of the dissent on
the claims against the brand defendant, he noted, but decline
at this time to conclude the public policy considerations that
ultimately drive the decision in this case, on balance, support
the imposition of a duty of care as suggested by [the
dissent].473 Three justices joined in a dissent stressing that the
brand-name manufacturer should have been regarded as owing
a duty to persons such as the plaintiff, that a reasonable jury
could find causation, and that the claims should not have been
snuffed out at the summary judgment stage.474
In two previously discussed cases, the Court of Appeals of
Missouri was faced with deciding whether the lower court had
been correct in granting a brand-name manufacturer summary
judgment on the plaintiffs negligence and misrepresentation
claims against it. The respective plaintiffs in the two cases,
Franzman v. Wyeth, Inc.475 and Nicely v. Wyeth, Inc.,476 had
469. Id. (An overwhelming majority of courts adjudicating this issue have
affirmed judgments or granted dispositive motions dismissing claims against
the brand defendants when the plaintiff used only the generic formulation.).
See also id. at 380.
470. Id. at 380.
471. Id. The plurality spoke approvingly of the proposed FDA rule that, if
promulgated, would allow generic makers to use the CBE regulation as a basis
for beginning to use a strengthened label without prior approval from the
FDA. See id. at 369, 38081. The proposed rule would be the appropriate way
to address the unfairness resulting from Mensing, rather than turning Iowa
tort law upside down. Id. at 369. For discussion of the CBE regulation and
the proposed but long-stalled rule, see supra text accompanying notes 4547
and supra notes 234, 268.
472. Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 381 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially).
473. Id. (Cady, C.J., concurring specially). See also id. at 382 (Hecht, J.,
joined by Wiggins and Appel, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
474. See id. at 382 (Hecht, J., joined by Wiggins and Appel, JJ., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
475. Franzman v. Wyeth, Inc., 451 S.W.3d 676 (Mo. App. 2014).
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used only a generic version of the drug at issue, not the brand-
name version.477 This critical fact doomed each plaintiffs
chances. Employing reasoning similar to what the Huck
plurality articulated in the Iowa case,478 the Missouri court
held in Franzman and Nicely that regardless of the particular
legal theories the plaintiff sought to employ, applicable state
law would not permit the imposition of liability on the brand-
name manufacturer when its product was not the one the
plaintiff used.479 The lower court, therefore, had ruled correctly
on the claims against the brand-name manufacturer.480
One states highest court, however, has swum against the
tide of decisions rejecting claims against brand-name
manufacturers when the plaintiffs ingested only generic
versions of the drug rather than the brand-name medication. In
Wyeth, Inc., v. Weeks,481 a 2014 decision, the Supreme Court of
Alabama answered certified questions from a federal district
court and held that certain claims against brand-name
manufacturers could go forward despite the fact that the
plaintiff had not used the brand-name drug.482 A six-justice
majority so ruled, with three justices in dissent.483 The relevant
brand-name drug, Reglan, was one whose name figures
prominently in most of the cases discussed previously. As was
true of the plaintiffs in those other cases, plaintiff Danny
Weeks developed the disorder known as tardive dyskinesia
476. Nicely v. Wyeth, Inc., 451 S.W.3d 694 (Mo. App. 2014).
477. Franzman, 451 S.W.3d at 678; Nicely, 451 S.W.3d at 694. For
discussion of the courts treatment of the plaintiffs claims against the generic
manufacturer in Franzman and Nicely, see supra text accompanying notes
40112.
478. See supra text accompanying notes 35466.
479. Franzman, 451 S.W.3d at 68992; Nicely, 451 S.W.3d at 69697. In
each case, Kentucky law provided the relevant rules. Franzman, 451 S.W.3d
at 68990; Nicely, 451 S.W.3d at 696.
480. See Franzman, 451 S.W.3d at 692; Nicely, 451 S.W.3d at 697. The
Georgia Court of Appeals recently ruled the same way, upholding grants of
summary judgment in favor of brand-name manufacturers in cases in which
the plaintiffs consumed only generic versions of the relevant medication.
PLIVA, Inc. v. Dement, 335 Ga. App. 398, 780 S.E.2d 735, 2015 Ga. App.
LEXIS 772, at *1921 (Ga. Ct. App., Nov. 20, 2015).
481. Wyeth, Inc., v. Weeks, 159 So. 3d 649 (Ala. 2014).
482. See id. at 676 (Under Alabama law, a brand name-drug company may
be held liable for fraud or misrepresentation . . . by a plaintiff claiming
physical injury caused by a generic drug manufactured by a different
company.).
483. See id. at 677.
2016] GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS 639
after using metoclopramide, the generic equivalent of
Reglan.484
The Alabama court noted at the outset that the plaintiffs
had brought a fraud claim.485 They alleged that the brand-
name manufacturers falsely and deceptively misrepresented
or knowingly suppressed facts about Reglan or
metoclopramide, such that Danny Weekss physician, when he
prescribed the drug to Danny, was materially misinformed and
misled about the likelihood that the drug would
cause . . . tardive dyskinesia and related movement
disorders.486 The court pointed out that under the plaintiffs
theory of the case, the brand-name manufacturers (hereinafter
referred to collectively as Wyeth)487 were obligated to warn
Dannys physician about the risks of long-term use of the drug
and that the plaintiffs, as third parties, have a right to hold
Wyeth liable for the alleged breach of the duty.488
This formulation of the issues proved important to the
Weeks courts analysis. The court emphasized that because the
case was a fraud case rather than a product liability case, it
was different from other cases in which courts had rejected
claims against brand-name manufacturers.489 Explaining that
[t]his is not a claim that the drug ingested by Danny was
defective, the court noted that instead, it is a claim that
Wyeth fraudulently misrepresented or suppressed information
about the manner in which (i.e., the duration) the drug was to
be taken.490
In a further effort to distinguish the case from others in
which courts had held that the brand-name manufacturers did
not owe a duty to a plaintiff who did not ingest the brand-name
drug, the Weeks court stressed that the relevant duty in the
case before it was a duty on the part of Wyeth to warn the
physician.491 That duty could have been satisfied if Wyeth, as
allowed by federal drug regulation law, had sought FDA
484. Id. at 653. Weeks spouse was also a plaintiff. Id.
485. See id. at 655.
486. Id.
487. The defendants were the original brand-name manufacturer and other
companies that manufactured Reglan after evidently having acquired the
Reglan rights from the original manufacturer. See id. at 65354.
488. Id. at 655.
489. See id. at 65658.
490. Id. at 657.
491. Id. at 664, 67073.
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approval of a strengthened warning label or had adopted a
revised label without prior FDA approval by relying on the
CBE regulation.492 The Alabama court also emphasized that
even though the relevant duty was owed to the physician (the
learned intermediary), the plaintiffs were third parties entitled
to rely on that duty because of the physician-patient connection
and because of the nature of the prescription medication
system.493 Patients cannot obtain prescription medications
directly from a manufacturer; rather, the court noted, they can
only acquire such medications after obtaining a prescription
from a physician.494
The Weeks court therefore answered the certified question
by stating that under Alabama law, a brand-name drug
company may be held liable for fraud or misrepresentation (by
misstatement or omission), based on statements it made in
connection with the manufacture of a brand-name prescription
drug, by a plaintiff claiming physical injury caused by a generic
drug manufactured by a different company.495 According to the
court, it was not fundamentally unfair to hold the brand-
name manufacturer liable for inadequate warnings even
though it did not produce the product, because the
manufacturing process is irrelevant when the case is based on
warning deficiencies rather than manufacturing defects.496 As a
further reason for concluding that such a result was not unfair,
the court noted that the alleged misrepresentations on which
the case would be based were drafted by the brand-name
manufacturer and merely repeated, as allowed by the FDA, by
the generic manufacturer.497
Denying that it was turning [tort law] on its head,498 the
Weeks court stated that the question it was answering arose in
492. See id. at 659-61, 67273. The court noted that in allowing claims
against the brand-name manufacturers to go forward, it was not deciding the
merits of the case. Id. at 677 n.11.
493. Id. at 664, 67074.
494. Id. at 674.
495. Id. at 676.
496. Id. at 677.
497. Id.
498. Id. The court also denied that it was creating some species of
innovator liability. Id. One of the dissenting justices had expressed concern
that the courts reasoning could lead to instances in which firms that devote
the time, money, and effort to develop truly new products (the innovators)
might be held liable for problems with similar products later produced by
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the sui generis context in which we find prescription
medication.499 That context stemmed from [t]he unique
relationship between brand-name and generic drugs as a result
of federal law and FDA regulations, combined with the learned
intermediary doctrine and the fact that representations
regarding prescription drugs are made not to the plaintiff but
to a third party.500 Following up on the sui generis point, the
court offered this bit of dictum: Nothing in this opinion
suggests that a plaintiff can sue Black & Decker for injuries
caused by a power tool manufactured by Skil based on labeling
or otherwise.501
Three justices offered separate dissents.502 In the most
fully developed of the dissents, Justice Murdock expressed the
view that the majority, in trying to correct what it perceived as
a wrong, had committed a second wrong.503 He worked through
many cases that pointed in a contrary direction and asserted
that with the decision in Weeks, the court stand[s] alone as the
only appellate court in the country to hold that a brand-name
manufacturer may be responsible for injuries caused to a party
who ingests a generic drug that the brand-name manufacturer
did not manufacture or sell.504
IV. DETERMINING NEXT STEPS AND ASSESSING THE
STATE COURTS EFFORTS
As revealed in Section IIIs analysis, the reasoning
employed in Mensing and Bartlett (the second and third
decisions in the Supreme Courts pharmaceuticals trilogy)
suffers from various deficiencies. Now, a happenstance plays
companies that did not have to devote the level of resources the innovators
devoted. See id. at 70608 (Murdock, J., dissenting).
499. Id. at 677.
500. Id. The relevant context also included indications that Congress
regards state-law-based tort cases as complementary to the federal regulatory
efforts. Id. at 66162, 67677.
501. Id. at 677.
502. Id. at 681 (Moore, C.J., dissenting), 683 (Parker, J., dissenting), 684
(Murdock, J., dissenting).
503. Id. at 686 (Murdock, J., dissenting).
504. Id. at 704. See also id. at 696703. For extensive discussion of the
major arguments against allowing consumers harmed by generic drugs to sue
brand-name manufacturers, see Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg, & Cary
Silverman, Warning: Shifting Liability to Manufacturers of Brand-Name
Medicines When the Harm Was Allegedly Caused by Generic Drugs Has Severe
Side Effects, 81 FORDHAM L.J. 1835, 185572 (2013).
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a critical and outsized role in determining the patients possible
rights if she is harmed by a prescription drug. Did the
pharmacist fill the patients prescription with the brand-name
drug or, instead, a generic equivalent?505 If a consumer
experienced harm after using a generic that arguably bore
inadequate warnings or was otherwise insufficiently safe, the
unfortunate hand operates and the Mensing-Bartlett duo
extinguishes, or at least severely limits, her ability to pursue
seek legal relief against the generic manufacturer.506 Of course,
she would be free to pursue such relief against the relevant
drug maker if the happenstance had gone the other way and
the pharmacist had dispensed the brand-name drug to which
the generic was equivalent.507
Given the pervasive presence of generics in the
marketplace and the laws that encourage their use, far more
harmed consumers will be dealt the unfortunate hand than will
receive the more favorable one.508 The question then becomes
what, if anything, to do about it. For the majority in Mensing
and Bartlett, the answer was easy: Congress, having enacted
the rules that created the unfortunate hand, can always change
the rules to eliminate it.509 But that convenient answer is
disingenuous. Even if one assumes that the Court was right in
laying the blame on Congress (as opposed to the Court itself for
its strained, faulty determination of the Hatch-Waxman Acts
effects), political realities make it exceedingly unlikely that
Congress would amend the drug regulation statutes and
accomplish a legislative overruling of Mensing-Bartlett.510 As
noted earlier, legislative moves along those lines have gone
nowhere,511 no doubt in large part because of opposition from
505. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2583 (2011) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) ([W]hether a consumer harmed by inadequate warnings can
obtain relief turns solely on the happenstance of whether her pharmacist filled
her prescription with a brand-name or generic drug.).
506. See id. at 2581 (We acknowledge the unfortunate hand that federal
drug regulation has dealt.).
507. Id.
508. See supra text accompanying notes 89; supra note 10.
509. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2582 (As always, Congress and the FDA retain
the authority to change the law and regulations if they so desire.).
510. See S. 2295 (112th): Patient Safety and Generic Labeling Improvement
Act, GOVTRACK.US (Apr. 18, 2012), https://www.govtrack.us/congress
/bills/112/s2295 (The bill was introduced April 18, 2012, in a previous session
of Congress, but was not enacted.).
511. See supra note 267.
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the generic pharmaceuticals industry.512 An industry heavily
insulated against tort liability by Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the relevant statutes is unlikely to sit idly by
during a legislative move to undo those decisions. Throw in
those in Congress who wish to rein in tort litigation, and
turning to Congress for relief from the unfortunate hand
becomes an unrealistic option.
What about the FDA? Justice Thomas suggested in
Mensing that perhaps the FDA could take action in a way that
would eliminate the unfortunate hand.513 Shortly after the
decision in Bartlett, the FDA signaled interest in moving in
that direction with the previously noted November 2013
announcement of a proposed regulation.514 If promulgated, the
proposed regulation would permit generic manufacturers to
take the CBE route and begin using a strengthened label
without prior FDA approval.515 Recall that in Wyeth v. Levine,
the brand-name manufacturers ability to invoke the CBE
regulation was a key reason why the Court rejected the
argument for preemption on the ground of impossibility,
whereas the generic makers inability to invoke the CBE
regulation helped support the Mensing conclusion that
impossibility preemption was appropriate.516 One assumes,
therefore, as the FDA did, that if the proposed regulation were
to become a final rule, Mensing would be administratively
undone and tort claims against generic manufacturers could
proceed just as such claims can proceed against brand-name
manufacturers under Levine.517 But there are potential
problems with that assumption.
First, there are serious questions about whether the
proposed regulation will survive to final rule stage in its
present form. As explained in earlier discussion, the move the
FDA wished to make has remained in the proposed regulation
stage for a long period of time, with the usual comment period
512. Id.
513. See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2582 (As always, Congress and the FDA
retain the authority to change the law and regulations if they so desire.).
514. See Paradise, supra note 267.
515. See supra note 268. For discussion of the CBE regulation, see supra
text accompanying note 47.
516. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 56870 (2009);Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 257576.
517. See Paradise, supra note 267 (The proposed rule discusses Wyeth,
PLIVA, and Bartlett, noticeably understating that the rule may eliminate
preemption for generic drugs.).
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closing, another comment period later opening up and closing,
and a public meeting for further comments having taken
place.518 Generic manufacturers and groups affiliated with
them have registered their opposition to the proposed rule for
reasons similar to why they would oppose unfortunate-hand-
altering legislation from Congress: they are largely exempted
from tort liability under Mensing and Bartlett, and they would
like to preserve that enviable position (as compared with the
position in which brand-name manufacturers find themselves
under Levine).519 Challenges in court to the validity of the
regulation, if it were promulgated, would be likely.520
Depending upon the outcome, those challenges would either
delay the effective date of the regulation or derail it entirely.521
Another sign that the proposed regulation may not achieve
final rule status is the previously noted fact that alternative
versions of the rule have been offered by interested parties.522
Comments on alternative versions have been invited by the
FDA and are being considered by the agency.523 It seems a safe
bet that if an alternative version were adopted, it would reflect
enough watering-down that there would be little, if any, dent in
the impossibility rationale set forth inMensing and Bartlett.
A further problem is that even if the proposed regulation
were promulgated, there is no guarantee that it would have the
FDA-desired effect of undoing Mensing-Bartlett and treating
generic manufacturers and brand-name manufacturers alike in
terms of potential tort liability. Although Justice Thomas
hinted inMensing that either Congress or the FDA might act to
alter the governing rules, Justice Alitos opinion for the Court
in Bartlett mentioned only Congress, and not the FDA, as
having the authority to change the relevant legal landscape.524
518. See supra note 268.
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. See id.
522. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved
Drugs and Biological Products; Public Meeting; Request for Comments;
Reopening of the Comment Period, 80 Fed. Reg. 8577 (proposed Feb. 18, 2015)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314, 601) (The purpose of the meeting is to
provide a public forum for FDA to listen to comments on the proposed rule on
changes being effected supplements that was published in the Federal
Register of November 13, 2013 and alternatives offered to this proposed
rule.).
523. See supra note 268.
524. SeeMut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2480 (2013).
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Perhaps the failure to mention the FDA was a deliberate
omission; perhaps not.
In any event, courtsand potentially the Supreme Court
would have occasion to determine whether the regulation, if it
were promulgated, would really have the effect of undercutting
the Mensing-Bartlett rationale and making Levine-like
reasoning apply in cases against generic manufacturers. The
impossibility rationale set forth in Mensing included Justice
Thomass addition of an independent-action element that
seemingly had not been part of the impossibility doctrine
before.525 In Mensing, the FDA had taken the position that
when generic manufacturers become aware of important safety
information after their product has been on the market, they
have a duty to propose that the FDA approve a strengthened
label.526 The Court declined to defer to that agency
interpretation but stated that even if generic manufacturers
were assumed to have such a duty under those circumstances,
impossibility preemption would remain applicable because the
generic makers still would be unable to act independently to
satisfy their state-law-based obligations without violating
federal law.527 Because FDA approval of such a proposal would
still be necessary, the Court reasoned, the proposal would not
be enough of an independent action by the generic makers to
avoid impossibility preemption.528
An FDA regulation opening up the CBE avenue to generic
manufacturers would permit such manufacturers to begin
using a strengthened label without prior approval, just as
brand-name manufacturers can, and would seem to be more of
an independent action than the mere proposal for FDA action
commented on in Mensing.529 Yet even when the CBE route is
525. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 257781 (2011). See also id.
at 2582, 2586 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
526. Id. at 2577 (The FDA argues that . . . [i]f a generic drug
manufacturer believes new safety information should be added to a products
labeling, it should contact the FDA . . . .).
527. Id. at 2579.
528. Id. at 258081.
529. Examining Concerns Regarding FDA's Proposed Changes to Generic
Drug Labeling: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 113th Cong. 5 (2014) (statement of Janet Woodcock,
Director, Center for Drug Evaluation & Research, Food & Drug
Administration) (Under the proposed rule, generic drug application holders
would have the same ability as brand drug application holders to update
product labelings . . . .).
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pursued, the FDA must ultimately approve the strengthened
label if use of it is to continue over the long term.530 The CBE
regulation permits use of the revised label without prior
approval, but the drug maker pursuing the CBE route must
simultaneously initiate an FDA approval process with regard
to the revised label.531 It is conceivable that because of the
independent-action element added to the impossibility doctrine
in Mensing, the Court could determine in a later case that even
the CBE option, if made available to generic manufacturers,
would not be sufficient independent action because FDA
approval would still be necessary.532 Such a conclusion by the
Court would require a further gloss on the impossibility
doctrine and perhaps a bit of recasting of Levine, but it is a
possibility that should not be discounted, given the content and
tone of Mensing and Bartlett.
As explained previously, the federal courts of appeal have
done little to lessen the impact of Mensing and Bartlett on
consumers harmed by the generic drugs they used.533 That is
not surprising, of course, given the obligation to follow Mensing
and Bartlett. With the two Supreme Court decisions reasonably
lending themselves to a broad interpretation, the duty to be
faithful to those decisions and the desire to avoid being
reversed seemingly have given the federal courts of appeal
little inclination to be adventurous when they determine the
preemptive reach of Mensing and Bartlett. Those courts have
paid little or no attention, as noted earlier, to Mensing and
Bartlett footnotes containing language that a court might
interpret as suggestions of possible ways to make the
preemptive sweep of the decisions at least marginally
smaller.534
Moreover, even when they have held that a potentially
important claimthe previously discussed failure-to-update
claimis not preempted, most of the federal courts of appeal
have gone on to reject the claim on the basis of inadequate
pleading or supposed logical inconsistency.535 Thus, despite
530. See id. (Under the proposed rule, . . . FDA would reach a decision
regarding the approvability of the labeling proposed by the generic and brand
drug application holders regarding the safety issue at the same time.).
531. See id.
532. See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 257781.
533. See supra text accompanying notes 299330.
534. See supra text accompanying notes 32223.
535. See supra notes 306, 313, 369.
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appearing to throw consumers harmed by generics the failure-
to-update bone, most of the federal courts of appeal then moved
quickly to retrieve the bone before the plaintiffs could pick it
up.
Some of the federal courts have commented on the Catch-
22 circumstances facing harmed consumers of generics and
have otherwise acknowledged their plight, but have felt, as a
Sixth Circuit panel noted, compelled [by] the controlling
caselaw to rule as they did.536 Some courts have noted that
Congress or the FDA might remedy the problem with
appropriate action.537 The Tenth Circuit even suggested that
state courts could play a key role in ameliorating the situation
by weighing the relevant policy considerations and shaping
state tort law in ways that might escape Mensing-Bartlett
preemption.538
With federal courts understandably not feeling free to do
much, if anything, about the Mensing-Bartlett problem for
consumers harmed by generics, some state courts have
partially filled the void.539 The cases discussed in Section IV of
the Article suggest that state courts have been more inclined
than the federal courts to consider ways of respecting Mensing
and Bartlett yet keeping their preemptive effect within
reasonable bounds. In doing so, these state courts have seized
upon the previously mentioned Mensing and Bartlett footnotes,
have engaged in careful comparisons of the facts in the cases
before them with the facts in Mensing and Bartlett (sometimes
finding important differences), and seemingly have picked up
on the Tenth Circuits suggestion regarding the crafting of
state tort law.540 The state courts thus appear to have stood up
for their citizens against the potential steamrolling effect of
Mensing-Bartlett and the Catch-22 that tandem contemplates.
536. Strayhorn v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., 737 F.3d 378, 407 (6th Cir. 2013)
(noting Catch-22 of having claims against generic manufacturers preempted
and not being able to sue brand-name manufacturers because only generics
were used); Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1290 (10th Cir. 2013)
(noting the same Catch-22).
537. See Strayhorn, 737 F.3d at 407; Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1290; Guarino v.
Wyeth, LLC, 719 F.3d 1245, 1253 (11th Cir. 2013).
538. Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1290 ([F]ederal law does not prevent a state
from providing a damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of FDA
regulations.).
539. See e.g., Guvenoz v. Target Corp., 30 N.E.3d 404, 426 (Ill. App. 2015);
Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 2014).
540. See supra text accompanying notes 33756.
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As the following assessment reveals, the state courts efforts
sometimes have been both admirable and sound but other
times, despite being commendable, have fallen short in terms of
soundness.
A. FAILURE-TO-UPDATE CLAIMS AND THE STATE COURTS SOLID
GROUND
Considering the content and thrust of Mensing and
Bartlett, state courts are on the most solid ground in their
decisions holding that failure-to-update claims are not
preempted. Such claims are a particular type of failure-to-warn
claimand both Mensing and Bartlett held that the failure-to-
warn claims before the Court were preempted.541 As some of
the state courts have sensibly recognized, however, failure-to-
update claims are meaningfully different from the failure-to-
warn claims held preempted inMensing-Bartlett.542
The Supreme Court of Iowas decision in Huck v. Wyeth,
Inc.,543 provided the most complete roadmap to a conclusion
that failure-to-update claims are not preempted. Four of the
other state court decisions discussed above offered similar
reasoning.544 Huck and the other decisions recognizing failure-
to-update claims take the position that the preemption
rationale articulated in Mensing and applied in Bartlett should
point in the opposite direction with regard to failure-to-update
claims.545 Huck and company establish this well-reasoned
proposition: If the duty of sameness contemplated by the
Hatch-Waxman Act and relied on in Mensing bars a generic
manufacturer from using a label containing a stronger warning
than is set forth in the FDA-approved label for the brand-name
drug, the duty of sameness should help to furnish the basis for
liability if the generic manufacturer did not use the
541. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013); PLIVA, Inc. v.
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2569 (2011) ([F]ederal law preempted state laws
imposing the duty to change the drugs label upon generic drug
manufacturers.).
542. See supra text accompanying notes 35466, 38790, 40124.
543. See Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 2014).
544. For discussion of those decisions, see supra text accompanying notes
38790, 40124.
545. For discussion of those decisions, see supra text accompanying notes
38790, 40124.
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strengthened, later-approved label that the brand-name
manufacturer has employed.546
Through this reasoning, Hucks conclusion (and that of
other state courts) can be seen as consistent with Mensings
rationale despite the different outcome on the preemption
question.547 Thus, the duty of sameness does not change in its
substantive content. What changes, depending on the
circumstances, is its effect. Sometimes the generic
manufacturer cannot use a revised label (as in Mensing, so
preemption applies there).548 Other times the generic
manufacturer must use a revised label (as in Huck, so
preemption does not apply there).549
The state courts failure-to-update cases, especially Huck
and Franzman v. Wyeth, Inc.,550 illustrate another important
point for plaintiffs to keep in mind if they wish to have their
claimswhether failure-to-update claims or other causes of
actionescape preemption. Courts must keep the same point
in mind when they consider such claims. As made clear in Huck
and Franzman, the plaintiff cannot simply assert a violation of
federal law and use that violation as the legal reason why the
plaintiff should receive legal relief.551 Why not? Recall that the
federal drug regulation laws do not include any provision
authorizing a private right of action to enforce the obligations
set forth there.552 Plaintiffs must be able to point to state law,
whether statutory or common law, that contemplates the same
obligation set forth in federal law or a duty arguably
546. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 36466. For the articles earlier discussion of
Huck and Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2013), the federal
court decision that proved influential in Huck, see supra text accompanying
notes 33769.
547. See PLIVA, Inc., v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 257478; Huck, 850
N.W.2d at 36466. If a case presenting a failure-to-update claim such as the
one in Huck and the other state court cases were to make its way to the
Supreme Court, the Court would be hard-pressed to find it preempted unless
the Court ignored what Mensing said and put an unwarranted spin on that
decision. See id.
548. See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2578.
549. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 364 (PLIVA needed only go through the
changes being effected process to revise its label to match the updated brand-
name label.).
550. Franzman v. Wyeth, Inc., 451 S.W.3d 676 (Mo. App. 2014). For the
articles earlier discussion of Franzman, see supra text accompanying notes
40112.
551. Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 36768, 369; Franzman, 451 S.W.3d at 68889.
552. E.g.,Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574 (2009).
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comparable to the federal duty.553 In other words, the plaintiffs
state-law-based claim must depend upon the existence of a
duty that is parallel to a federal duty.554 The federal duty, of
course, is relevant to the case and will no doubt be addressed as
the case progresses, but the plaintiffs claim ultimately is based
on the parallel state duty.555
In the failure-to-update context, the state law duty
comparable to the federal duty to use the strengthened, FDA-
approved label is the defendants common-law obligation to
provide suitable warnings regarding its product if the product
poses meaningful risks to the user.556 An inquiry can be made
with regard to state-law-based tort or warranty claims that
contemplate duties arguably parallel to the duty contemplated
by the federal misbranding statute, which classifies a drug as
misbranded if its labeling does not adequately warn against
safety hazards.557 Thus, state courts fashioning and applying
common law rules and legislatures enacting statutory duties
may be able, as two federal courts of appeal have suggested, to
recognize state-law bases of liability that afford harmed
consumers some relief from the Mensing-Bartlett unfortunate
hand.558 Importantly, to the extent that legislatures and state
courts (particularly their highest courts) provide meaningful
content to such causes of action under state law, the federal
courts will have to respect those state determinations rather
than guessing what a state might or might not recognize under
its law.
In addition, states that recognize duties parallel to those in
federal law may take advantage of a possible signal that
Justice Alito sent in Bartlett. In a footnote, he observed that
the Court was not considering a tort claim meant to parallel
553. See Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578, 58687 (6th Cir. 2013).
554. Fulgenzi, 711 F.3d at 58687; Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 368.
555. See Fulgenzi, 711 F.3d 578, 58689; PLIVA, Inc. v. Dement, 335 Ga.
App. 398, 780 S.E.2d 735, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 772, at *511 (Ga. Ct. App.,
Nov. 20, 2015); Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 36869.
556. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 36869; Dement, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 772,
at *810.
557. See Dement, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 772, at *11.
558. See Strayhorn v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 737 F.3d 378, 407 (6th Cir.
2013); Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1290 (10th Cir. 2013). For
discussion of the misbranding statute, see supra text accompanying notes 48
53. See also Dement, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 772, at *1012 (concluding that
state-law duties not to sell misbranded drugs parallel the federal duty in that
regard).
2016] GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS 651
the duty provided for in the federal misbranding statute.559
With this statement, Justice Alito suggested at least the
possibility that cases dealing with parallel duties might not get
the Mensing-Bartlett preemption treatment.560 State courts and
legislatures may wish to treat that possibility as a realityand
thereby give harmed consumers some ability to seek legal relief
from generic manufacturersunless and until the Supreme
Court specifically rules to the contrary.
The state court decisions on failure-to-update claims are
also noteworthy in their display of an apparent lets-give-the-
plaintiff-her-day-in-court mindset. As previously noted, federal
courts of appeal have held that failure-to-update claims are not
preempted under Mensing-Bartlett.561 Most of these courts,
however, have dismissed the claims because they were not
properly pleaded or because of supposed logical inconsistency
stemming from the plaintiffs separate allegations that a fully
adequate warning would have gone beyond the warning in the
label later approved by the FDA.562 This treatment of failure-
to-update claims may result in part from enhanced federal
pleading requirements called for in a 2009 Supreme Court
decision.563 However, the logical inconsistency rationale comes
across as a hyper-technical objection that unduly restricts
plaintiffs ability to argue in the alternative and unnecessarily
restricts their opportunity to prove what they need to prove in
order to prevail. Unlike most of the federal courts of appeal, the
state courts appear to take the position that plaintiffs should
receive a reasonable chance to prove that even a less-than-ideal
warning along the lines of the later-approved label would still
have been sufficient to alert them, as well as their physicians,
regarding the dangers and to influence them to pursue a
different medical treatment.564
559. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S.Ct. 2466, 2477 n.4 (2013).
560. Id.
561. See supra text accompanying note 330.
562. For discussion of those decisions, see supra notes 306, 313, 369.
563. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
564. See Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578, 58788 (6th Cir. 2013); see,
e.g., Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 363 n.7 (Iowa 2014).
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D. STATE COURTS ATTEMPTS TO NARROW THE SWEEP OF
MENSING-BARTLETT
In Hassett v. Defoe,565 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
concluded not only that a failure-to-update claim should go
forward, but also that some other failure-to-warn and design
defect claims should escape preemption under Mensing and
Bartlett.566 The court interpreted the two Supreme Court
decisions as narrowly as possible. Certain failure-to-warn
claims based on generic labels content that corresponded to the
FDA-approved label clearly had to be considered preempted
under Mensing and Bartlett, but the Hassett court limited the
preempted category so that it would cover only failure-to-warn
claims arising prior to the 2007 amendments to the federal
drug regulation laws.567 In neither of the two Supreme Court
decisions did the Court expressly limit its preemption holding
in that way.568 However, in the Mensing footnote noted various
times in the Article, Justice Thomas did observe that the court
was applying the federal law as it existed prior to the 2007
amendments and that it was not considering whether the 2007
amendments might affect the analysis.569 Unlike the federal
courts of appeal, which have not ascribed any significance
either way to the Mensing footnote, the Hassett court seized on
it.570
The Pennsylvania court regarded the 2007 amendments as
important in two respects: for supposedly confirming an
obligation on the part of all drug manufacturers to seek FDA
approval for a revised label if they later acquire important
safety-related information; and for empowering the FDA to
order the use of a strengthened label rather than merely being
able to negotiate with the brand-name manufacturer about the
prospect of adopting a revised label.571 The latter aspect of the
565. Hassett v. Defoe, 74 A.3d 202 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
566. Id. at 217.
567. Id. at 206, 217. Earlier discussion of Hassett appears at supra text
accompanying notes 370400.
568. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013); PLIVA, Inc.,
v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
569. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574 n.1.
570. See Hassett, 74 A.3d at 20607, 217. For discussion of the federal
courts silence on the Mensing footnote, see supra text accompanying notes
32124.
571. See Hassett, 74 F.3d at 217 & n.13. Discussion of the 2007
amendments appears at supra text accompanying notes 5557.
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amendments seemed especially significant to the Hassett court.
It regarded that grant of power to the FDA as removing some of
the uncertainty about whether a strengthened label would
ultimately resultuncertainty the Mensing majority noted in
concluding that the supposed obligation to approach the FDA
about a strengthened label was not enough to defeat
impossibility preemption.572 The Hassett court concluded,
therefore, that Mensing should not be treated as calling for
preemption of claims based on facts that arose after the 2007
amendments.573 At least it would be premature, the court
noted, to hold such claims preempted.574
Hassetts above-described approach to whether failure-to-
warn claims are preempted is at least plausible. It is not
unreasonable to conclude that through the Mensing footnote,
Justice Thomas may have sent a signal about such an
approach. Yet it is far from clear that the Supreme Court, if it
were to review a case presenting a failure-to-claim based on
post-2007 facts, would decide that the 2007 amendments
indeed make a difference in the controlling analysis. Until we
receive more definite word from the Supreme Court, Hassetts
approach to whether failure-to-warn claims are preempted
rests on moderately stable, but not rock-solid, ground.
In Hassett, the Pennsylvania court went on to hold that
despite Bartlett, various design-defect claims were not
preempted.575 The court argued that the state-law-based claims
did not contemplate a need for the generic manufacturer to
change the drugs composition or warning labelactions that
the Supreme Court said the tort claims in Bartlett
contemplated but that federal law prohibited.576 The Hassett
courts valiant effort to distinguish the design-defect claims at
issue from those in Bartlett comes off, however, as too much of
a stretch and as effectively an attempt by the court to follow
the Bartlett dissenters rather than what Bartlett, rightly or
wrongly, held.577
572. Hassett, 74 F.3d at 217 & n.13.
573. See id.
574. Id. at 217.
575. Id.
576. See id. at 21214.
577. See id.; see also id. at 21921 (Platt, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (criticizing majority for not properly interpreting Bartlett).
For discussion and analysis of the majority and dissenting opinions in
Bartlett, see supra text accompanying notes 176214, 25096.
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The recent Illinois Court of Appeals decision in Guvenoz v.
Target Corp.578 reveals a well-reasoned effort to distinguish
Mensing and Bartlett and thereby narrow their preemptive
effect. The Guvenoz court seemed motivated by a concern about
the generic manufacturers attempt to avoid responsibility, as
evidenced by the previously noted characterization of the
defendants position early in the courts opinion.579 But in
reaching what seemed a foregone conclusion based on that
characterization, the court demonstrated careful analysis in
holding that the plaintiffs failure-to-warn and design-defect
claims escapedMensing-Bartlett preemption.580
Although the court noted the possibility that the 2007
amendments to the federal drug regulation laws might be
important to a determination of the fate of some claims against
generic manufacturers, the Guvenoz court ultimately did not
rest its decision on that possibility.581 Instead, the court made
the most of an important factual difference between the case
before it and the Mensing-Bartlett duo. The factual difference
was the FDAs eventual decision to order that Darvocet and its
generic equivalents (the drug at issue in Guvenoz) be
withdrawn from the market because of safety concerns.582 The
relevant drugs in Mensing and Bartlett had not been ordered
off the market.583
Whereas the Supreme Court said in Mensing and Bartlett
that the state-law-based claims at issue in those cases called
for the defendant to do things it could not do under federal law
(using a different label or changing the drugs composition), the
Guvenoz court could use the ultimate fact that the relevant
drug was ordered off the market as a credible basis for stating
that the plaintiffs claims did not call for a strengthened label
or a change in the drugs composition.584 Rather, as the court
noted, the plaintiffs claims rested on the premise that no
578. Guvenoz v. Target Corp., 30 N.E.3d 404 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
579. Id. at 409. See also supra text accompanying notes 43334.
580. See Guvenoz, 30 N.E.3d at 41319, 42226. There was no failure-to-
update claim in Guvenoz, presumably because there was no factual predicate
for such a claim.
581. See id. at 41617.
582. Id. at 41819.
583. See id. at 41011, 41819.
584. Id. at 41819.
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remedial measure could have made the unreasonably
dangerous drug sufficiently safe.585
Further, the FDAs order that the medication be removed
from the market enabled the Guvenoz court to assert
confidently that Bartletts disapproval of the stop-selling
argument should not be an obstacle to the plaintiffs ability to
pursue her state-law-based claims.586 Bartletts rejection of the
argument that a defendant could avoid the impossibility
problem by simply not selling the drug occurred in a context in
which the drug at issue, though harm-causing to some, was
clearly beneficial to many.587 The Guvenoz context was very
different, the court astutely recognized. Darvocet and its
generic equivalents were not to be sold any longer because of
FDA concern that its dangers significantly outweighed its
benefits.588 Therefore, claims under state law that the
defendant should be held liable for selling an unreasonably
dangerous drugone that probably should not have been on
the market anywaywere not inconsistent with federal law.589
Guvenoz demonstrates that through careful analysis, state
courts can sometimes find meaningful differences between the
cases before them and the Supreme Courts Mensing-Bartlett
tandem and can offer some relief from the unfortunate hand
dealt to consumers harmed by generic drugs. In doing so, they
can offer a reminder that Mensing and Bartlett are not the only
relevant Supreme Court decisions. There is also Wyeth v.
Levine. Although Levine involved tort claims against a brand-
name manufacturer, it emphasized the important point that
Congress has traditionally envisioned a meaningful role for
state-law-based liability as a complement to the federal
regulatory regime.590
585. Id.
586. Id. Importantly, Justice Alito suggested in Bartlett that even though
the stop-selling argument normally would not be given credence, such an
argument might have validity in an instance where the relevant drug had
been outlawed. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2478 n.5
(2013).
587. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 247172.
588. Guvenoz, 30 N.E.3d at 419.
589. Id. at 41819.
590. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 57879 (2009).
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B. WHETHER STATE COURTS SHOULD ALLOW CONSUMERS
HARMED BY GENERIC DRUGS TO SUE BRAND-NAME
MANUFACTURERS
With Mensing and Bartlett having severely restricted the
ability of harmed consumers to proceed with tort claims against
the generic manufacturers whose drugs they used, it is
understandable that they have tried to pursue claims against
manufacturers of the relevant brand-name drugs to which the
generics must correspond in composition and label. As noted
earlier, however, the federal courts of appeal have unanimously
rejected such claims because, in their view, the common law of
the relevant states would not allow the imposition of liability
regardless of how the claims were denominatedon defendants
whose product the plaintiffs did not use.591 Some courts of
appeal have acknowledged the plaintiffs Catch-22 plight,592
and two appellate judges, in concurring and dissenting
opinions, have voiced some support for the possible recognition
of such claims.593 But the sympathy and tentative support have
not translated into federal court approval of such claims.
At the state level, generic-ingesting plaintiffs prospects for
obtaining relief from brand-name manufacturers seem brighter
in the short run, thanks largely to Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks.594 The
Supreme Court of Alabamas authorization of such claims
stands out as the lone appellate decision to go that way, but
only four state appellate courts in a total of five decisions
(counting Weeks) have weighed in on the issue so far. In one of
the other decisions, Huck v. Wyeth, Inc.,595 three of the seven
Supreme Court of Iowa judges took the position that claims by
generic users against brand-name manufacturers should be
permitted; a fourth judge leaned strongly that way before
reluctantly answering negatively and providing a majority for
591. See supra text accompanying notes 30810, 33335.
592. Strayhorn v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 737 F.3d 378, 407 (6th Cir. 2013);
Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1290 (10th Cir. 2013).
593. See Johnson v. TEVA Pharms. USA, Inc., 758 F.3d 605, 61719 (5th
Cir. 2014) (Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting
court should have certified question to Louisiana Supreme Court about
whether such claims should be permitted); Fullington v. Pfizer, Inc., 720 F.3d
739, 74748 (8th Cir. 2013) (Murphy, J., concurring) (suggesting such a claim
could be viable, but that plaintiff in case before court had failed to raise it at
district court level).
594. Wyeth Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So. 3d 649 (Ala. 2014).
595. Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 2014).
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rejecting such claims.596 In the other three decisions, two by the
Missouri Court of Appeals and one by the Georgia Court of
Appeals, the courts declined to authorize claims by generic-
using plaintiffs against brand-name makers.597
Two questions therefore become important. First, will the
notion of permitting generic users claims against brand-name
manufacturers catch on with other state courts? Second, should
that notion catch on? The fact that Alabamas highest court has
ruled as it did could make other courts take notice and consider
going the same route in interpreting or fashioning their
common law. The significant level of support for that notion
among the members of the Supreme Court of Iowa could have a
similar effect. Importantly, if state courtsparticularly states
highest courtsdefine or interpret their common law as
permitting such claims, federal courts would have to respect
those decisions and would be limited in their ability to predict
that the relevant state would not permit claims of that nature.
The Weeks majority laid out a plausible case for permitting
generic-ingesting consumers to proceed against brand-name
manufacturers claims under Alabama common law. Ultimately,
however, the court found it necessary to note the sui generis
nature of the pharmaceuticals context as both a reason for, and
limiting factor regarding, its decision.598 Troubling questions
and potential problems that attend a Weeks-like approach,
however, may make otherwise-tempted state courts reluctant
to sign on to the notion of recognizing such claims as a way of
eliminating the Catch-22 plight of consumers harmed by
generic medications.
Even though federal court conclusions about whether their
states common law would allow claims are not binding on
them, state courts may find it hard to take issue with the large
volume and unanimity of the federal-court decisions ruling out
596. See id. at 356, 381 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially), 382 (Hecht, J.,
joined by Wiggins and Appel, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see also supra text accompanying notes 46265, 47074.
597. PLIVA, Inc. v. Dement, 335 Ga. App. 398, 780 S.E.2d 735, 2015 Ga.
App. LEXIS 772, at *1921 (Ga. Ct. App., Nov. 20, 2015); Franzman v. Wyeth,
Inc., 451 S.W.3d 676, 68992, 694 (Mo. App. 2014); Nicely v. Wyeth, Inc., 451
S.W.3d 694, 69697 (Mo. App. 2014).
598. Weeks, 150 So. 3d at 677. For discussion of the courts analysis, see
supra text accompanying notes 481501. The dissenting judges in Huck also
offered a plausible interpretation of Iowa common law in authorizing such
claims. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 382402 (Hecht, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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claims by generic-using consumers against brand-name
manufacturers. They may also worry about taking traditional
principles regarding duties owed by manufacturers regarding
their products and expanding them to include a duty to persons
who consumed someone elses product (even though the
products are identical). The pharmaceuticals context may be
sui generis, as the Weeks court noted,599 but other courts may
not favor adopting what could be construed as a special set of
rules regarding pharmaceuticals or may be leery of whether
that special set of rules, if adopted, would remain confined to
the drug context.
Other state courts may also object to aWeeks-like approach
on public policy grounds. As Justice Murdock argued in his
Weeks dissent, it may not be fair to put brand-name
manufacturers on the hook for harm experienced by generic
users even though generic versions must match the relevant
brand-name drugs in composition and label.600 The extent of
liability for the brand-name maker under the Weeks approach
could be vast, considering the dominant position of generics in
the market. Moreover, generic manufacturers have been
relieved by Congress of the time-consuming and expensive
burden of seeking the safety-and-effectiveness-related approval
that brand-name manufacturer must obtain.601 As a result,
generic manufacturers ability to compete with the brand-name
maker on price has been enhanced.602 With generic makers
already having received the competitive benefit just noted,
should brand-name makers be expected to carry the liability
burden when a generic user is harmed? Even courts bothered
by Mensing-Bartletts dealing of the unfortunate hand to
consumers harmed by generics may be unlikely to see imposing
liability on brand-name manufacturers as a satisfactory
solution.
Finally, recognizing claims by harmed generic users
against brand-name manufacturers would seem undesirable in
a next-steps sense. If the brand-name manufacturer were to
face liability in such a situation, should it be able to implead
the relevant generic manufacturer on some sort of contribution
599. Weeks, 150 So. 3d at 677.
600. Id. at 70608 (Murdock, J., dissenting). See also Schwartz, Goldberg,
& Silverman, supra note 504, at 187072.
601. See Schwartz, Goldberg, & Silverman, supra note 504, at 184445.
602. See supra text accompanying notes 69, 6164, 28385.
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claim? One would expect the brand-name manufacturer to try
doing so because, after all, it was the generic makers product
that the harmed plaintiff consumed. But would such a
contribution claim be barred on preemption grounds, given
Mensing-Bartlett? Whereas the harmed consumers tort claims
against the generic manufacturer were held in Mensing-
Bartlett to call for changing the drugs composition or approved
label (actions barred by federal law),603 the brand-name
manufacturer could argue that its contribution claim, rather
than contemplating such actions, merely sought a sharing of
responsibility for the harm that was caused. Yet the spirit of
Mensing-Bartlett might not countenance such a claim. Another
question would pertain to whether there would be an
independent legal basis for such a contribution claim by the
brand-name manufacturer against the generic maker.
These sorts of questions would seem likely to makeand
probably should makemost state courts disinclined to use the
common law as a vehicle for allowing generic users to pursue
claims against brand-name manufacturers. The questions also
may be ones that lend themselves better to legislative action.604
If a state legislature were to consider enacting a statute that
authorized harmed generic users to take legal action against
brand-name manufacturers, it not only could debate the
fundamental question of whether such a claim should be
recognized but also could consider related questions regarding
whether a contribution claim of the sort noted above should be
recognized. Of course, a state statute along those lines would
not eliminate possible preemption concerns under Mensing-
Bartlett, but a legislative determination of policy priorities
regarding the imposition of liability in this context would seem
preferable to a purely judicial determination.
V. CONCLUSION
In the PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing and Mutual Pharmaceutical
Co. v. Bartlett decisions, the Supreme Court ruled that federal
law preempts consumers failure-to-warn-and design-defect
claims against the generic manufacturers whose drugs harmed
603. See supra text accompanying notes 16265, 18595.
604. See Strayhorn v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 737 F.3d 378, 407 (6th Cir.
2013); Guarino v. Wyeth, LLC, 719 F.3d 1245, 1253 (11th Cir. 2013).
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them.605 The Courts earlier decision in Wyeth v. Levine,
however, permits such claims to go forward if the plaintiff
experienced harm as a result of taking the brand-name
medication as opposed to its generic equivalent.606 After
Mensing and Bartlett, then, whether patients harmed by a
prescription drug can pursue tort claims against the drugs
manufacturer depends largely upon a happenstance: whether
the pharmacist who filled the patients prescription dispensed
the brand-name medication or, instead, a generic equivalent.
The Court wrongly blamed Congress for this unfortunate
hand dealt to consumers harmed by generics, when it was the
Courts strained application of preemption principles that
served as the real culprit. But lower federal and state courts
and, of course, harmed consumersare stuck with the Courts
rulings. Congressional action to remedy the Mensing-Bartlett
unfortunate hand607 is exceedingly unlikely. A potentially
promising regulatory proposal floated by the FDA has become
long-stalled, with its prospects of progressing to final-rule stage
seeming to dim with age.608
The lower federal courts have interpreted Mensing and
Bartlett broadly and have ruled, accordingly, that nearly all
state-law-based claims by harmed consumers against generic
manufacturers are preempted or otherwise ineligible to go
forward. State courts, on the other hand, have shown
significantly greater tendencies to resist an overly broad
reading of Mensing and Bartlett and to identify ways of
respecting those decisions while carving out room for certain
state-law-based claims against generic manufacturers. As this
Article has explained, the state court resistance to the
Mensing-Bartlett steamroller has yielded well-reasoned
approaches applicable to certain claims against generic
manufacturers, along with otherssuch as permitting
consumers harmed by generics to sue the relevant brand-name
manufacturerthat are well-meaning but inadvisable. Going
forward, state courts potentially interested in lessening the
effect of the Mensing-Bartlett unfortunate hand should not be
quick to conclude that the answer is to recognize claims by
605. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013); PLIVA, Inc. v.
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
606. SeeWyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
607. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2581 (2011).
608. See supra notes 234, 268.
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generic users against brand-name manufacturers. Rather, the
better approach is to consider, as seen in various state court
decisions analyzed above, sensible ways in which certain claims
against the relevant generic manufacturers can be held to
escape the seemingly broad preemptive sweep of the Supreme
Courts decisions.
***
